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Introduction* 
 
 
 
The following four claims are plausibly true: (1) We ought to cut down 
on our greenhouse gas emissions. (2) Suffering is bad. (3) There is 
some reason not to eat factory farmed meat. (4) The three previous 
judgments are epistemically justified. These claims – claims about 
oughts, value, reasonhood, and so on – are normative claims. How 
should we explain their meaning? What is it to accept such claims? 
That is, what are normative judgments? Are these judgments really 
apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity? Are there normative 
facts that could make them true? If so, are these facts dependent on 
our wishes or opinions? Is it possible to know how things are, norma-
tively speaking? These are some of the questions that metanormative 
theory deals in. Metaethics is a brand of metanormative theory, the focus 
of which is on the ‘practical realm’ of the normative – on judgments 
concerning what there is reason to do, what would be desirable, and 
so on. In this doctoral thesis my concern is mostly with issues in 
metaethics. 
 Within metaethics, a fundamental distinction can be drawn be-
tween views that might be called ‘cognitivism’ and ‘expressivism.’ 
 According to cognitivism, the meaning of the sentence ‘There is 
reason not to eat factory farmed meat’ is to be explained with refer-
ence to how this sentence claims the world to be – with reference to 
its truth-conditions. What is it then to think that there is reason not 
to eat factory farmed meat? On the cognitivist view, it is to believe 
that the world is a certain way, or to represent the world as being a 
                                                 
* I thank Jussi Suikkanen, Pilvi Toppinen, and Pekka Väyrynen for their 
comments on earlier versions of this introductory essay. 
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certain way – it is to have a belief that shares its truth-conditions with 
the sentence ‘There is reason not to eat factory farmed meat.’ Cogni-
tivism is the prevalent view in metaethics. 
 According to a rival view, expressivism, the meaning of the sentence 
‘There is reason not to eat factory farmed meat’ is not to be explained 
by its truth-conditions, but rather by the kind of ‘desire-like’ attitude 
or mental state that this sentence expresses. On the expressivist view, 
to think that there is reason not to eat factory farmed meat is, then, to 
be in this mental state. It is not to represent the world as being a 
certain way; it is to endorse, or to be for not eating factory farmed meat. 
(Actually, this is an overly simple and somewhat inaccurate character-
ization of the difference between cognitivism and expressivism. But 
this should do for now. I shall say more on this later.) 
 In this thesis, I endeavor to offer some support for the expressiv-
ist view. I present an argument against the cognitivist alternative and 
attempt to respond to some of the central objections to expressivism. 
I also argue that some forms of expressivism are preferable to others, 
and outline a kind of view that I find especially attractive. I call this 
view ‘the higher-order state view.’ 
 This is the view that normative sentences express, not beliefs (as 
the cognitivist says), not just desire-like states (as the pure expressivist 
says), and not pairs or sets of desire-like states and beliefs (as the 
ecumenical expressivist says), but rather the higher-order states of 
having one’s beliefs and desire-like states related in certain ways. On 
this view, to make a normative judgment is to be in a state of having a 
certain kind of set of beliefs and desires – that is: in a state of being in 
a certain kind of belief/desire state (thus the name ‘higher-order state 
view’). Or, as we might also say, it is to be in a state in which a certain 
kind of relation holds between one’s beliefs and desire-likes states.1 
                                                 
1 I outline the higher-order state view in Essay 1 (Toppinen 2013a). I owe 
the idea of characterizing this view in explicitly relational terms to Mark 
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This sounds somewhat complicated, but the basic idea is quite simple. 
An example might help a little. What is it to think that there is reason 
not to eat factory farmed meat? Some say it is to believe that things 
are so and so – maybe, that not eating factory farmed meat has the sui 
generis property of being supported by some reason(s), or that the fully 
rational versions of ourselves would want us not to eat factory 
farmed meat. Others say, roughly, that it is to desire that factory 
farmed meat not be eaten. The higher-order state view says that it is 
to be in the state of having some desire-like state (perhaps a desire to 
avoid suffering, perhaps some other desire) and a belief that is suita-
bly linked to this desire (perhaps a belief that not eating meat con-
tributes to there being less suffering, perhaps some other belief). This 
sounds quite intuitive. Or so I hope, anyway. 
 Still, this is all bound to sound somewhat abstract. Why should we 
be interested in the meaning of normative sentences, or in the nature 
of normative thought? How do the issues concerning normative 
language and thought relate to other philosophical issues having to do 
with oughts, values, and such? Why would someone be a cognitivist 
or an expressivist? 
 In the rest of this introductory essay I first explain in some more 
detail what metaethics is (section 1). I then proceed to offer a charac-
terization of the dispute between the cognitivist and the expressivist 
about normative judgment (section 2) and a quick review of some of 
the notable strengths and weaknesses of the main brands of cogni-
tivism (section 3) and expressivism (section 4). I close by offering a 
brief summary of my claims in the articles constitutive of this doctor-
al thesis (section 5). 
 
 
                                                                                                    
Schroeder (2013), who has also recently suggested the possibility of this kind 
of view, calling it ‘relational expressivism.’ 
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1. Metaethics2 
Let us consider the claim that we ought to cut down on our green-
house gas emissions. This is plausibly true because we should stop 
overheating the Earth, and it seems we can only accomplish this if we 
drastically reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. These claims about 
what we ought to do or should do are normative. They seem interest-
ingly different, for example, from the apparently non-normative 
claims that we are heating the atmosphere, that it looks like we might 
easily end up heating it by several degrees Celsius during the next 
century, or so, and that our heating of the atmosphere will cause 
much suffering to people in poorer countries as well as to future 
generations of humans and other sentient beings. 
 There is an intuitive difference between the claims that concern 
how things are and the “oughty” claims concerning how things ought 
to be – or between facts and values, as they say. These are not entirely 
happy ways of drawing the distinction that is at issue here. If I say 
that we ought to stop overheating the Earth, am I not saying that this 
is how things are, and am I not in some sense committed to this 
being a fact? Maybe I am, and this is indeed how I will be using the 
term ‘fact.’ But the intuitive distinction survives. As Allan Gibbard 
(2008: 179) points out, “When the detective admonishes, ‘Just the 
facts, ma’am,’ it isn’t responsive to say, ‘The creep deserved it, and 
that’s a fact!’” 
 Still, it is hard to draw a precise distinction between the normative 
and the non-normative. Claims that employ terms such as ‘ought,’ 
‘desirable,’ and ‘reason’ often seem oughty or value-laden in the rele-
vant sense. These terms, however, are not always used to make 
normative claims in the sense that is at issue here. Maybe I ought to 
use the fork with my left hand, but this is not necessarily to admit 
                                                 
2 This section is inspired by many introductory remarks on metaethics, 
including those offered in Wedgwood 2007a and Schroeder 2010a. 
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that there is any reason for me to do so. In one sense I ought to – 
that’s what etiquette says; I acknowledge that. But actually I do not 
act accordingly (I use the fork with my right hand), and this is not 
because I am being weak willed, but rather because I do not think 
that this particular ought carries any genuine normative weight. There 
are, then, ought-facts of sorts that are just facts about social norms. I 
can grant that such a fact obtains and yet think: ‘so what?’ Claims 
about such social facts are not normative in the sense that we are 
after here. If one accepts such claims, one is not thereby committed 
to thinking that there would be any reason to act accordingly (or that 
acting in this way would be good or desirable or rational, say). 
 I shall not say anything more informative about the distinction 
between the normative and the non-normative. A pre-theoretical, 
intuitive grasp of the distinction, which we may admit to being vague 
and to allowing for border-line cases, should be just fine for my 
purposes. It is perhaps difficult to say what exactly this distinction 
amounts to. And with regard to many claims, it may be unclear which 
side of the distinction they belong to. Still, that this distinction marks 
an important difference between two kinds of claims seems quite 
clear.3 
 The claim that we ought to stop heating this planet is not a claim 
about whether we think that we ought to do so, and the truth of this 
claim does not seem to depend in any straightforward way on our 
attitudes toward global warming, or toward the suffering of future 
generations. Let us imagine that we all – the current population of the 
world – thought that there was no need to stop making the Earth 
warmer, or that we all wanted above all to make future generations 
suffer, or even to eliminate all life on Earth. Plausibly, even if this 
were so, we still ought to try to stop heating this planet. In this sense, 
the claim in question seems to be objectively true. 
                                                 
3 Cf. Jackson 1998: 120–121; Enoch 2011: 1–2; Parfit 2011b: 265–269. See 
also Finlay 2010b. 
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 Now, this is not entirely uncontroversial. That is okay. Let us 
suppose, for a moment, that we ought not to fight the global warm-
ing. We might pick other examples. The following may plausibly be 
an objective normative truth: there is at least some reason not to 
torture toddlers. In the end we might even reject the idea of there 
being any objective normative truths concerning what we have reason 
to do. Some do. Still, that such objective normative truths exist is, at 
least initially, a powerful, attractive idea. 
 How can there be any objective normative truths, though? For 
example, the (presumed) fact that we ought to stop making the Earth 
warmer looks somehow very different from the fact that we are 
heating this planet.4 We – or some relevant specialists among us, 
anyway – have a fairly good grasp of what it is for us to be raising the 
temperature on the surface of this planet. Our heating this planet 
roughly amounts to a certain group of creatures of a certain kind 
doing things that result in certain molecules in the atmosphere vibrat-
ing faster. But what is it for it to be the case that we ought to stop 
heating this planet? That seems like a tougher question. Note that the 
tough question does not necessarily concern whether there is such a 
fact as the fact that we ought to stop heating the planet. This might 
not be such a difficult question. Plausibly, we ought to stop heating 
this planet, and so there is such a fact, alright (in the metaphysically 
light-weight sense that I am using the term). Still, even if this is so, 
what are normative facts? Can we say something theoretically illumi-
nating about them? Should we be able to say something theoretically 
illuminating about them? 
 Whatever normative facts are, they seem to be interestingly related 
to non-normative or descriptive facts. If two objects or possible 
worlds are exactly alike in all their non-normative or descriptive 
features, then they must also be alike in their normative features. The 
                                                 
4 I shall use ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ interchangeably here. 
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normative supervenes on the descriptive. Why is this? There are meta-
physical puzzles concerning the normative. 
 We also do not have very good grasp of how to explain our 
managing to figure out what it is that we ought to do. One might be 
tempted to think that whereas we know how to measure the changes 
in the surface temperature of the Earth (some of us do, in any case), 
and some of us also have some pretty good ideas of how to explain 
the changes in the temperature, we do not know how to go about 
determining what we ought to do and why. But this does not seem 
exactly right. Actually we do seem to know how to go about deter-
mining what we ought to do and why: we reflect on the problematic 
cases as well as on the normative principles or ideas that we find 
attractive, we consult our friends and those we deem wiser, and so 
on. Still, how this all works is puzzling. For instance, normative 
knowledge seems in part a priori. Yet many seemingly a priori norma-
tive truths are not analytic, that is, something we could know simply in 
virtue of being competent users of the relevant concepts. Normativity 
raises epistemological puzzles, too. 
 And there is more that is puzzling about normativity. One might 
think that it is relatively clear what we mean when we say that the 
surface temperature of the Earth has risen by 0.8 °C in the past 
hundred years. When we say this, we are talking about a certain 
celestial body, and about how a certain property of this celestial body, 
having to do with the movements of certain tiny particles – molecular 
kinetic energy – has changed over time. We can, in other words, give 
at least a rough account of the truth-conditions for the sentence ‘The 
surface temperature of the Earth has risen by 0.8 °C in the past 
hundred years.’ It is possible for us to state in non-trivial terms what 
it would take for this sentence to be true. And it is not implausible 
that we might be able to somehow explain the meaning of this sen-
tence in terms of its truth-conditions. 
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 But can we give a similar, enlightening story about the meaning of 
normative sentences? What are we talking about when we talk about 
what we ought to do? Some, perhaps the majority of philosophers 
working on the relevant issues, believe that the answer is not that 
different. When we say that we ought to stop heating the Earth, we 
are saying that certain actions of ours – those that would constitute 
our stopping to heat the Earth – have a certain property, namely that 
of being supported by the balance of reasons. But unlike in the case 
of the temperature, it is not so clear that we have a good grasp of this 
normative property of being supported by the balance of reasons. 
How, then, should we explain the meaning of normative language? 
 Normative thought raises similar questions. What is it that we are 
thinking when we think that we ought to stop heating the atmos-
phere? It is not just that we do not have a very good understanding, 
at least as yet, of what normative facts are like, and so of what this 
thought might be about. Normative thought seems to have some 
rather distinctive features. For instance, if I think that I contribute to 
the rising of the Earth’s surface temperature, this belief or judgment 
of mine does not, in itself, seem to have any motivational implica-
tions. What I do about my contributing to global warming plausibly 
depends on what I care about, or desire. If I would rather not con-
tribute to it, I will (try to) change my behavior. If I am entirely 
pleased with how things stand, my belief concerning my contribution 
to global warming will not move me toward action. Suppose, by 
contrast, I think that I ought to compensate for my CO2 emissions. If 
I do not take any steps toward compensating for those emissions I 
believe are due to my actions, this should strike us as very puzzling. 
Did I genuinely think that I ought to compensate? Was I somehow 
prevented from acting accordingly? Am I perhaps suffering from 
severe depression, or some such general motivational disorder? The 
idea that a normative judgment is essentially linked to motivation is 
often called ‘motivational internalism.’ This idea can take many 
Introduction 
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forms, but one example of a plausible internalist claim that will show 
up frequently in what follows is the following: 
 
(PRACTICALITY) Necessarily, if one judges that φ-ing would be desir-
able, then, if one is rational, one is thereby also motivated to φ.5 
 
Being rational is to be understood here roughly as being internally 
coherent. I am failing to be rational in this sense, for instance, when I 
believe that p, that if p then q, and yet reject q, or when I intend to 
perform some action, φ, believe that in order to perform this action, 
it is necessary that I do something else, ψ, and yet fail to intend to ψ 
(cf. Broome 1999; Smith 2004; Dreier forthcoming). I am not failing 
to be rational in this sense simply thanks to, say, desiring to kill every-
one. How can we explain (PRACTICALITY)? What must normative 
judgments be like for this thesis to be true? Can they really be beliefs 
about something, like my beliefs concerning the shapes or colors of 
things, or the ways in which I contribute to global warming, for 
example? 
 Again, the thought is not that it seems as though there are no 
normative facts, or that we cannot have knowledge about such facts, 
or that normative talk would be without meaning and normative 
thought without content. Normative thought and talk certainly seem 
meaningful, and there are plausibly some normative truths that we 
also know of. Still, these issues raise a number of deep philosophical 
questions about how to explain certain things – the truth of (PRACTI-
CALITY), for instance, or the supervenience of the normative on the 
descriptive. 
                                                 
5 My formulation of (PRACTICALITY) has been inspired by Michael Smith’s 
(1994: 143), Ralph Wedgwood’s (2007a: 25), and Michael Ridge’s (forthcom-
ing a: Ch. 2; forthcoming b) formulations of rationality-conditioned motiva-
tional internalism. 
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 Metaethics deals, then, in issues concerning, among others, the 
meaning of normative claims, and the possibility of there being 
normative truths. It should offer explanations for truths such as 
(PRACTICALITY) or the supervenience of the normative on the de-
scriptive, assuming that they are truths. Metaethics does not offer 
responses to questions concerning the content of normative truths – 
assuming that there are such things. Answering such questions would 
be the business of normative ethics. A fairly simple example of a view in 
normative ethics is classical utilitarianism, according to which the moral-
ly right course of action is determined by the consequences of the 
various courses of action open to us in terms of the balance of hap-
piness and suffering in the world (see Sidgwick 1907). This view in 
normative ethics is compatible with many metaethical views. If 
cognitivism is correct, then someone who accepts classical utilitarian-
ism believes that only actions with optimal consequences (in terms of 
the balance of happiness and suffering) have the property of being 
right. If expressivism is correct, then, roughly speaking, someone who 
accepts classical utilitarianism has a ‘pro-attitude’ of a certain kind 
toward performing actions that have such optimal consequences. 
 Why should one be interested in metanormative theory or in 
metaethics? More specifically, why be interested in the nature of 
normative thought or in the explanation of the meaning of normative 
language? What does it matter whether cognitivism or expressivism is 
true? Although metaethics does not directly address questions con-
cerning what is wrong, good, or right and why, its results are of some 
interest also from the point of view of normative ethics (including 
ethical questions that constantly arise in our daily lives). Some views 
in metaethics imply that nothing is, for example, wrong, good, or right. 
Others tell us that what is wrong, good, or right is a wholly subjective 
matter, or that it is something determined by our social norms. When 
non-philosophers engage with metaethical questions, they often find 
these nihilist, subjectivist or relativist views attractive. People often 
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find it hard to see how objective oughts and values can find their 
place within a credible, broadly scientific worldview. But when they 
engage with ‘first-order,’ normative ethical issues, they often betray a 
different kind of commitment, a commitment to there being objec-
tively correct answers to some of the ethical questions. A neat feature 
of the expressivist option in metaethics, for example, is that it seems 
to hold the promise of allowing us to see how there can be objective-
ly correct answers to normative (e.g. moral) questions, without ap-
pealing to any claims that those attracted by subjectivist, relativist and 
nihilist ideas would have any trouble accepting. (Perhaps the same 
can be said of some other metanormative views, too.) Making sense 
of this possibility would be one good motivation for being interested 
in the debates concerning the relative merits of the different expres-
sivist and cognitivist accounts of normative thought and talk. 
 Another reason to be interested in the debates concerning the 
relative merits of the different cognitivist and expressivist views, or in 
metaethics, more broadly construed, is that metanormative questions 
are gaining more and more attention within philosophy, also outside 
metaethics. Many philosophically intriguing concepts and phenomena 
may be ‘fraught with ought’ in the same way as ethical concepts and 
phenomena. Perhaps having knowledge is roughly a matter of being 
trustworthy or a good informant; meaning may have to do with how we 
ought (in some interesting, genuinely normative sense) to use language. 
If so, then the ideas that are familiar from metaethics – expressivism, 
for instance – might have interesting applications in many other 
central areas of philosophy (see e.g. Chrisman 2007; Gibbard 2012). 
And of course the expressivist idea of explaining the meaning of 
sentences in terms of the states of mind that they express, for exam-
ple, might have interesting applications outside metaethics regardless 
of whether the context of application would involve specifically 
normative matters (see e.g. Schroeder 2010a: ch. 11). 
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 Finally, questions concerning the meaning of normative language 
and the nature of normative thought are quite interesting in them-
selves. What, then, more precisely, is at issue between the cognitivist 
and the expressivist? 
 
 
2. Cognitivism vs. Expressivism – What Is at Issue? 
Cognitivism is, again, and to a first approximation, the view that to 
think that happiness is good (say) is, at least in part, to believe that 
happiness has the property of being good (where different cognitiv-
ists understand this property in different ways).6, 7 Beliefs are here 
understood roughly as states that have the function of fitting how the 
world is, or that ought to fit how the world is. They have a represen-
tational, mind-to-world ‘direction of fit.’ 
 Expressivism, by contrast, says, very roughly, that to think that 
happiness is good is to be in a desire-like state.8 It is to have a pro-
attitude of some kind toward happiness: for instance, to desire that 
there be happiness, or to plan to promote happiness, or to approve of 
happiness. These desire-like states have a motivational, world-to-mind 
direction of fit. Their function or telos is to make the world with them 
– to make us change the world so as to make their content true. 
 The different functional roles of beliefs and desires can be illus-
trated with the following simple example. Let us suppose it seems to 
                                                 
6 I use the term ‘happiness’ here in a non-normative, psychological sense, 
but it is also often used (by philosophers, in particular) in an evaluative 
sense, to make normative judgments of sorts about people’s lives. See 
Haybron 2008: 29–32. 
7 The property-talk in metaethics is very non-committal. Even those who 
think that, strictly speaking, there are no properties should find a way of 
formulating the relevant claims in some suitable way (cf. Copp 2007: 7: n. 
12; Enoch 2011: 5). 
8 More precisely, this is what pure expressivism says. I briefly discuss the 
different brands of expressivism in section 4 below. 
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me that my pack of licorice infusion bags is empty. My belief that 
there is some licorice infusion in my office would (or at least should) 
tend to go out of existence; my desire that there would be some 
licorice infusion in my office would (or at least should) not tend to go 
out of existence, but would (or at least should) rather tend to make 
me go buy some more of the stuff.9 
 According to cognitivism, the mental state expressed by a norma-
tive sentence is, at least in part, a belief with a normative content. For 
example, the sentence ‘Happiness is good’ would express a belief that 
happiness is good. There are many ways in which the expression 
relation could be understood. One possibility would be that the 
sentence ‘Happiness is good’ expresses a belief that happiness is good 
roughly in the sense that having this belief is among the necessary 
conditions for correctly asserting the relevant sentence. There are 
other possibilities, but there is no need to discuss them here.10 I shall 
call the mental state expressed by a normative sentence a normative 
judgment, and say that according to cognitivism, normative judgments 
are beliefs with a normative content, whereas according to expressiv-
ism, they are, rather, (roughly) desire-like states.11 
 This is a helpful way of distinguishing between cognitivism and 
expressivism, but this understanding of the distinction needs some 
                                                 
9 Accounts of the distinction between beliefs and desires in terms of a 
notion of a direction of fit are offered e.g. in Smith 1987; Smith 1994: 111 – 
125, 208–210; Humberstone 1992; and Zangwill 1998 – Anscombe 1963: 
§32 being a classic source of inspiration. These accounts are criticized in 
Sobel & Copp 2001 and Tenenbaum 2006 (see also Zangwill 1998; 2005; 
2010). For a more recent account and a response to these criticisms, see 
Gregory 2012. 
10 See Schroeder 2008a: 24–35; 2008b, and my discussion – which draws 
heavily from Schroeder – in Essay 1, sec. 4. 
11 Using the term ‘normative judgment’ for a mental state (instead of a 
mental or linguistic act of some kind) sounds a bit strange, perhaps, but this 
is a standard usage in contemporary metaethics.  
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revising. I shall make one important revision now (and another in 
Essay 2 (Toppinen forthcoming b)).12 
                                                 
12 I have characterized cognitivism and expressivism as involving commit-
ments with regard to explaining both the meaning of normative language 
and the nature of normative thought. One could distinguish more carefully 
between the theses concerning normative language and normative thought, 
respectively, and say the following (much of what has been inspired by 
Wedgwood 2007a: ch. 1 and Schroeder 2010a: chs. 2 and 4): According to 
factualism, the meaning of normative sentences is to be explained at least in 
part by what they are about – that is: by their truth-conditions. The meaning 
of ‘Torture is wrong,’ for instance, is, on this view, to be explained by what 
would make this sentence true. According to non-factualism, a sentence such 
as ‘Torture is wrong’ has a meaning that is different in kind from the mean-
ing of a sentence such as ‘Snow is white.’ On the non-factualist views, the 
meaning of normative sentences is not to be explained by their truth-
conditions, but rather by their having a different kind of function. So, for 
example, Rudolf Carnap (1935: 24) once suggested that a sentence such as 
‘Torture is wrong’ would be an imperative in disguise (being equivalent in 
meaning with ‘Do not torture!’). In his Language, Truth and Logic, first pub-
lished in 1936, Alfred J. Ayer (1946: ch. 6) put forward the view that a moral 
sentence like this would in some appropriate sense express the feelings of 
the speaker. Charles Leslie Stevenson’s (1937; 1944; 1963) idea was, very 
roughly, that the sentence ‘Torture is wrong’ would be used to say that the 
speaker disapproves of torture and to encourage the hearers to do so as well. 
(It is perhaps worth pointing out that Ayer (1946: 108) made a similar 
suggestion in passing in his 1936 book, writing that “we may define the 
meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings 
they are ordinarily taken to express, and also of the different responses 
which they are calculated to provoke.”) And Richard M. Hare (1952) took 
himself to be improving on these earlier accounts in presenting a view 
according to which the meaning of normative sentences was to be explained 
by their being suitable for issuing universal prescriptions (which were in 
some ways like imperatives but not reducible to them). Expressivism could 
then be said to be a non-factualist view, according to which the meaning of 
the sentence ‘Torture is wrong’ is explained by what it is to think that torture 
is wrong. In other words, according to expressivism, the meaning of ‘Tor-
ture is wrong’ is explained by what state of mind this sentence expresses. 
The emotivist views of Ayer and Stevenson, and the prescriptivist views of 
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 It used to be the case that the fundamental division in metaethics 
between the cognitivist views and the competing views – which were 
then called ‘non-cognitivist’ – was drawn mainly in terms of whether 
normative sentences are truth-apt or not. Cognitivism was taken to be 
                                                                                                    
Carnap and Hare are plausibly interpreted as speech act theories of sorts. On 
these views, the meaning of normative sentences is to be explained by what 
kinds of speech acts the sentences are suited for performing. Expressivism 
can take the form of a speech act theory. But expressivism can also be 
developed in other ways. An expressivist can say that expressing a mental 
state is not a matter of performing a speech act, but rather, “a special kind of 
relationship between a sentence and a mental state – one in virtue of which 
the sentence means what it does” (Schroeder 2010: 74). On this view, 
“Happiness is good” expresses the mental state that it does in just the same 
sense as the sentence “Snow is white” expresses the belief that snow is white 
– however exactly we cash that out. As suggested above, this might be 
cashed out for instance in terms of the idea that being in the state expressed 
provides the correctness conditions for asserting the sentence in question. 
Cognitivism could now be taken to be a view about the nature of normative 
judgment, only, that goes very naturally with factualism, and according to 
which normative judgments are to be ultimately understood as beliefs with 
normative content. Non-cognitivism would be the view that normative judg-
ments should rather be ultimately understood as desire-like – a view that 
could naturally be combined with expressivism, and perhaps also with other 
non-factualist views. As noted, factualism and cognitivism, in the sense 
suggested in this note, go very naturally hand in hand. The same applies to 
non-factualism and non-cognitivism. (See Wedgwood 2007a: 37–38.) This is 
why I have decided to simplify things and run (plausible versions of) these 
views together under the headings of ‘cognitivism’ and ‘expressivism,’ 
respectively, in the main text. It should, however, be noted that in doing so I 
may have obscured from view some interesting options that combine non-
factualism with cognitivism, or factualism with non-cognitivism. Terence 
Horgan and Mark Timmons (2006a) call their view ‘cognitivist expressivism,’ 
but their view counts, I believe, as straightforwardly expressivist in my sense. 
Mark Eli Kalderon (2005), however, develops a view that combines factual-
ism with non-cognitivism. I do not find this view very plausible, but I 
cannot (even try to) substantiate my doubts here. For criticisms of Kalde-
ron’s view, see Eklund 2007, Chrisman 2008b, and Lenman 2008b. For 
further debate, see Kalderon 2008 and Eklund 2009. 
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the view that normative sentences make claims about how things are, 
and are apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity; non-
cognitivism was taken to be the view that normative sentences make 
no distinctively normative claims at all about how things are, and 
cannot be either true or false, but rather only give expression to our 
desire-like states or feelings. Non-cognitivism was understood to 
involve the denial of the existence of normative properties, truths, 
facts, and beliefs, as well as the possibility of normative knowledge.13 
 The representatives of the expressivist tradition have indeed often 
denied the existence of normative properties, facts, and such.14 But 
the contemporary expressivist, who is likely to deploy a minimalist 
account of the relevant concepts, might not wish to deny this.15 
Suppose, for a moment, that expressivism is correct. We may still 
accept normative claims: that torture is wrong, say. Very roughly, 
then, given minimalism about the relevant concepts, there is nothing 
more to its being true that torture is wrong than torture’s being 
wrong, and nothing more than this to torture’s having the property of 
being wrong or to its being a fact that torture is wrong. We are com-
mitted to thinking that some normative facts exist simply in virtue of 
accepting some normative claims. And so, even if expressivism is 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Sayre-McCord 1988a: 7–8; 2006: 40; Gibbard 1990: 8; Wright 
1992: 6–7; Smith 1994: 10–12, 2000; Darwall 1998: 71–72; Jackson 1998: 
113–117; Joyce 2001: 9–16; Shafer-Landau 2010: 297–299; Parfit 2011b. 
Actually, as these references testify, this still is a fairly common way of 
drawing the distinction between cognitivism and the opposing views in the 
expressivist tradition. 
14 See e.g. Carnap 1935: 24, Ayer 1946: ch. 6; Gibbard 1990: 7–8, ch. 6; von 
Wright 2000. (On von Wright’s relation to non-cognitivism, see Toppinen 
2013c.) 
15 See e.g. O’Leary-Hawthorne & Price 1996; Blackburn 1998a: 77–79; 
1998b; Gibbard 2003: 181–183. Cf. also Stevenson 1944: 169 ff., 267–268; 
1963: 214–220; Smart 1973: 8. 
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true, it may very well be that there are some normative facts. (You 
will agree to some normative claims, right?)16 
 This is why it seems more promising to draw the distinction 
between cognitivism and expressivism in terms of the kinds of states 
that are being expressed by normative sentences rather than in terms 
of whether normative sentences are truth-apt or purport to state 
facts. It is not essential to expressivism to deny the very plausible idea 
that normative claims may be true or false. Expressivists just do not 
wish to explain the nature of normative thought and the meaning of 
normative talk in terms of normative judgments’ functioning to 
represent normative reality. And it is not like the expressivist is saying 
that although there are normative facts, they are only second-rate, 
quasi-facts, really. Blackburn (1993; 1998a) famously advances a 
program that he calls ‘quasi-realism,’ but this is not the view that 
there are only quasi-truths about normative matters. It is, rather, very 
roughly, the view that we must explain our thought and talk concern-
ing normative matters – which involve many features that motivate 
realist views – in terms that do not presuppose the existence of 
normative properties, facts, and such. This is quite compatible with 
saying that there are genuine normative facts – really, and strictly 
speaking. First-rate facts (whatever that means). 
 The problem of ‘creeping minimalism’ – that is: the problem of 
distinguishing between expressivism and cognitivism given a mini-
malist take on the notions of truth, fact, and the like – is not properly 
addressed so easily, however. For surely my judgment that torture is 
wrong, which is truth-apt and possibly states a normative fact, is a 
belief with a normative content. A quasi-realist who wishes to do 
                                                 
16 In this and the following couple of paragraphs, I draw from Essay 2. For 
minimalism, see e.g. Horwich 1998; Künne 2003; and Price 2011, and, 
particularly in the context of metaethics, Dreier 2004a. 
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justice to common sense must also countenance the existence of 
normative beliefs it seems.17 
 What distinguishes expressivism from the rival cognitivist view, 
then? (An equally good question is, of course: what distinguishes 
cognitivism from expressivism? The challenge is not faced by the 
expressivist alone.) Building on earlier work, Dreier (2004a: 39) 
suggests the following answer to this problem:18 
 
[E]xpressivists are distinguished by their claim that there is nothing 
to making a normative judgment over and above being in a state that 
plays a certain “non-cognitive” psychological role, a role more like 
desire than it is like factual belief. In particular, to explain what it is to 
make a moral judgment, we need not mention any normative proper-
ties. 
 
The expressivist can now agree that normative judgments are norma-
tive beliefs. She just does not explain normative belief with reference 
to normative properties.19 Rather, she says that a normative judg-
ment, a state expressed by a normative sentence, has the property of 
being a belief with a normative content in virtue of its having a 
property of being a certain kind of desire-like state. The belief-like 
features of these judgments are explained by their desire-like features. 
Or so says the expressivist.20 
                                                 
17 See Divers & Miller 1995; Timmons 1999: ch. 4; Dreier 2004a; Horgan & 
Timmons 2006a. 
18 See O’Leary-Hawthorne & Price 1996; Fine 2001; Gibbard 2003: Ch. 9. 
19 Matthew Chrisman (2008a) argues that the distinction between cogni-
tivism and expressivism cannot be drawn in terms of whether or not norma-
tive judgment is explained in terms of normative facts (an idea suggested by 
some passages in Dreier 2004a). It is better to formulate the thought in 
terms of properties. 
20 Cf. Broome 2008: 108. Does this mean that according to an expressivist, 
normative judgments are besires – unified, non-composite states with both 
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 What kinds of pros and cons do expressivism and cognitivism 
involve, respectively? Let us begin, in the next section, with a quick 
review of the cognitivist options. An overview of the strengths and 
potential weaknesses of expressivism will be given in section 4. 
 
 
3. Cognitivism 
It is often suggested that cognitivism is the default, common sense 
view. Many metaethicists suggest that people ordinarily think of 
normative matters – of moral issues, for example – in a way which 
suggests that most accept an objectivist form of cognitivism that is 
often called normative realism. This is a cognitivist view, according to 
which normative properties are in some appropriate sense independ-
ent of our beliefs and wants. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord offers a nice 
example of the thought that realism would be the default view. (He 
writes of moral realism, in particular, but this does not matter.) Ac-
cording to Sayre-McCord (2006: 40), when we engage in moral 
thought it seems as though 
 
                                                                                                    
mind-to-world and world-to-mind directions of fit? (This neat term was 
apparently first coined in Altham 1986: 284.) This might be considered to be 
a surprising result. The besire-views – John McDowell’s (1978; 1979) work is 
often considered to be a classic source of the idea – are usually considered to 
be cognitivist. And also, quite often, very implausible – see Smith 1994: 116–
125, in particular (and Little 1997; Garrard & McNaughton 1998; Zangwill 
2008a; and Ridge forthcoming a: Appendix 2, for further discussion). I 
believe it would make good sense to reserve the term ‘besire’ for states of 
mind the belief-like features of which are not explained by their desire-like 
features. These would be the kinds of states the existence of which has been 
debated in the literature referenced above. Also, the idea of a besire is, 
anyway, often too easily dismissed. Smith’s criticism of besires, for instance, 
relies on the rejection of a motivational internalist view on which normative 
judgments necessarily involve certain desires. This form of motivational 
internalism, however, is far from obviously false. 
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we are expressing beliefs about the world, about how it is and should 
be. Moreover, the beliefs we express – again, so it seems – are either 
true or false (depending on how things really are and should be), and 
when they are true, it is not simply because we think they are. Thus, 
if things are as they appear, in thinking morally we are committed to 
there being moral facts. And in making moral judgments we are mak-
ing claims about what those facts are, claims that will be true or false 
depending on whether we get the facts right. That things seem this 
way is pretty uncontroversial. 
 
Sayre-McCord (2006: 40) then goes on to say that moral realism “is 
the view that, in these respects, things really are as they seem,” and, 
having conceded that expressivists might have some issues with this, 
concludes that 
 
In any case, and by all accounts, moral realism is, at least initially, the 
default position. It fits most naturally with what we seem to be doing 
in making moral claims, and it makes good sense of how we think 
through, argue about, and take stands concerning moral issues. 
(Sayre-McCord 2006: 42.) 
 
This is a common line of thought (see e.g. McNaughton 1988: 39–41; 
Brink 1989: ch. 2, Smith 1994: 4–13; Copp 2007: 6–9; Enoch 2011: 
8–10). But as is clear from the discussion of the problem of creeping 
minimalism in the last section, it involves a different way of constru-
ing the difference between cognitivism and expressivism from the 
one that I have offered. And my way of drawing the distinction is 
better. If cognitivism is simply the view that our normative judgments 
are truth-apt beliefs, and if realism is simply the view that these 
beliefs sometimes get the (in some appropriate sense mind-
independent) normative facts right, then contemporary expressivists 
also tend to be cognitivist realists. We have lost sight of the interest-
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ing differences between these views. Now, of course, one might just 
be interested in defending realism in the sense suggested by Sayre-
McCord’s discussion. One could then perhaps find some comfort in 
the idea that most metanormative theorists would be in agreement 
about realism in this sense being true. 
 If some expressivist account should turn out to be correct, it 
might very well succeed in ‘vindicating’ (or explaining) what might be 
called the ‘folk conception’ of morality and other normative matters, 
which we may assume to have been successfully characterized by 
Sayre-McCord. On both the realist and the expressivist views, things 
would then really be as the folk conception has it. Both views would 
offer an equally natural fit with what we seem to be doing when we 
make normative claims. These views would offer different kinds of 
explanations for what is going on when we really are doing what we 
seem to be doing. But these explanations would not themselves be 
part of the folk conception. It is part of the folk conception, perhaps, 
that some acts really are objectively wrong, but it is not plausibly part 
of it that normative beliefs are to be ultimately understood as beliefs 
that concern certain kinds of properties – perhaps sui generis, perhaps 
naturalistic – and that the meaning of normative language should be 
explained with reference to these properties. Neither is the expressiv-
ist story a part of the folk conception. Plausibly, we can only figure 
out whether expressivism or cognitivism is correct by exploring the 
commitments involved in the folk conception. And if it turns out, for 
instance, that expressivism cannot vindicate the folk conception, then 
that is a problem for the expressivist. Still, it is no part of the folk 
conception that expressivism cannot vindicate it.21 
                                                 
21 For further discussion, see Loeb 2007; Cuneo 2011a; 2011b and Björns-
son 2012. Enoch (2011: 8–10) suggests that some of us “pre-theoretically 
feel” that expressivism is deeply problematic. We may pre-theoretically feel 
that some actions really are wrong, for example. But that is compatible with 
expressivism. We may perhaps even pre-theoretically feel that normative 
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 I do not think, then, that our common sense conception of nor-
mative thought and talk offers any presumption in favor of cogni-
tivism. But be that as it may, there is a rich variety of cognitivist 
views, all of which have been developed in sophisticated ways and 
have their strengths and weaknesses. In the rest of this section, I 
offer a brief review of these views. 
 The cognitivist views can be divided into the naturalist and non-
naturalist. All cognitivist views explain normative thought and talk 
with reference to normative properties. According to naturalistic 
cognitivism, normative properties – the normative features of the 
world – are identical with properties that could (at least in principle) 
be ascribed by non-normative or ‘descriptive’ terms. Let us say that 
non-normative and descriptive terms are terms that fall clearly 
enough on the ‘is’ side of the ‘is–ought’ distinction (Jackson 1998: 
120–121). These will include, then, the more narrowly (and properly) 
naturalistic terms that pick out properties that are “either causal or 
detectable by senses” (Miller 2003: 11). That is extremely rough, but 
this should suffice here. This way of characterizing the naturalistic 
view is problematic in that a view according to which the property of 
rightness is the property of being commanded by God, for example, 
might come out as a form of naturalism. That is a minus, but in the 
present context it is convenient to simply group both the more 
narrowly naturalist and the ‘supernaturalist’ views together. Also, it 
seems likely that the most plausible views which are forms of natural-
                                                                                                    
features are sui generis – or at least very different from naturalistic ones. But 
this, too, is compatible with expressivism. We may also ‘pre-theoretically 
feel’ that expressivism is implausible in the sense that once we do some 
metaethical theorizing it may seem to us that this view is implausible. It may 
even be true that the folk would tend to find expressivism implausible in this 
way. But this in itself would not be a strike against expressivism. It might 
still very well be that if the folk understood the view correctly, they would 
come to understand that expressivism explains their pre-theoretical feelings 
just fine. 
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ism according to my loose characterization are also naturalistic on 
some more fine-grained characterizations. 
 Let us suppose that a psychological property such as that of being 
desired is a naturalistic property. Then a subjectivist view according to 
which the property of being desirable just is the property of being an 
object of a desire would be an example of the naturalistic view. 
Another example would be a view, according to which the property 
of being morally right just is the property of being productive of the 
greatest balance of pleasure over pain. 
 Among naturalistic views, an important distinction is that between 
analytic naturalism and synthetic naturalism. 
 
 
3.1 Analytic Naturalism 
According to analytic naturalism, normative properties can be identi-
fied with some naturalistic ones a priori, thanks to normative sentenc-
es being analytically equivalent to some descriptive ones. In other 
words, the idea is that we can identify the property of being desirable, 
say, with some naturalistic property because we can analyze the 
concept of being desirable in terms of some naturalistic properties. 
Roughly, on this view, a sentence like ‘Happiness is desirable’ means 
the same as some sentence of the form ‘Happiness is N,’ where the 
latter sentence ascribes to happiness some natural property, N. By 
contrast, according to synthetic naturalism, normative sentences 
cannot be analyzed in naturalistic terms, but it may still be possible to 
identify normative properties with some naturalistic ones a posteriori. 
 One of the most sophisticated forms of analytic naturalism is 
Frank Jackson’s and Philip Pettit’s (Jackson & Pettit 1995; Jackson 
1998; 2006; 2009) ‘analytic functionalism.’ I shall expand a bit on this 
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view below.22 Earlier representatives of such a view include Ralph 
Barton Perry’s (1926: 116) view, according to which “x is valuable” 
can be analyzed as “interest is taken in x,”23 and David Lewis’s (1989) 
account, according to which it is analytic that something is valuable 
when we would be disposed, under conditions of the fullest possible 
imaginative acquaintance, to desire to desire it.24 
 It would be very cool, if one could pull off an attractive analysis of 
the content of normative judgments in naturalistic terms. Suppose, 
for a moment, that ‘x is valuable’ can be analyzed as ‘under condi-
tions of full imaginative acquaintance, we desire to desire x.’ If this 
                                                 
22 Another sophisticated, recent attempt at developing an analytic naturalist 
theory is that of Stephen Finlay’s (2010a; unpublished). 
23 By ‘interest,’ Perry (1926: 115) means “state, act, attitude or disposition of 
favor or disfavor.” 
24 Hutcheson (1725; 1728) is a potential representative of a subjectivist, 
analytic naturalist view (see e.g. Gill 2006: 295–301, n.2). Moore (1903: §14, 
§40; 1922b) famously attributes analytic naturalism to Jeremy Bentham, John 
Stuart Mill and Edward Westermarck (not to Spencer, as is often believed – 
see Moore 1903: §§31–33). It is not clear, however, that any of these think-
ers accepted the view. Bentham (1789: ch. 1, §10) seems to be the most 
likely case: 
 
Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility, one may 
always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it 
is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is 
right it should be done […]: that it is a right action […]. When thus 
interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that 
stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none. 
 
Yet all of these writers – Hutcheson, Bentham, Mill, and Westermarck – 
have also been given expressivist or non-cognitivist interpretations (see 
section 4, below). Analytical naturalism about reasons judgments, in particu-
lar, may also have been defended by many philosophers. Derek Parfit 
(2011b: 282–283: 433–463) singles out W. D. Falk and Bernard Williams, for 
example, and attributes this view (about reasons judgments) also – highly 
questionably, I would say – to J. L. Mackie. 
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were so, we would get relatively easy answers to many questions. 
What are facts about value? Well, they are just facts about what we 
would desire to desire under certain conditions. Why does the norma-
tive supervene on the natural? And why is it a priori that it does so 
supervene? Well, it is a priori that the normative ways the world is just 
are certain naturalistic ways the world is. So, if two worlds are exactly 
alike, naturalistically speaking, of course they are bound to be exactly 
alike normatively speaking, too.25 How can we have knowledge about 
value? In the same way that we can have knowledge about what we 
desire to desire under certain kinds of conditions – no special prob-
lems there either. 
 Analytic naturalism might even hold some promise with regard to 
explaining why (PRACTICALITY) is true. For suppose, to take another 
example of an analytical naturalist view, that to think that performing 
some action, φ, would be desirable is to think that an ideal version of 
oneself, of a certain descriptively specifiable kind, would desire that 
one performs φ. If this were so, then it might not be wholly implausi-
ble to think that if someone believes that performing φ would be 
                                                 
25 See e.g. Smith 1994: 41 – 43; Jackson & Pettit 1995: 21–22, 25. Actually, it 
is not clear that all forms of analytic naturalism can explain the a priori status 
of normative supervenience. On one version of the view, suggested e.g. by 
Jackson (1998: 142–144), normative properties are the properties that actually 
realize certain a priori and descriptively or naturalistically specifiable roles 
(Jackson seems to prefer but does not commit himself to this ‘rigidified’ 
version of analytic functionalism). But as has been pointed out by Mark van 
Roojen (1996b), it does not follow from this that these properties themselves 
must be natural ones. It seems then that we cannot, simply in virtue of 
mastering the relevant concepts, rule out the possibility that in the actual 
world, w, a certain action, φ, has the non-natural property of being right, but 
that in w*, which is identical with w, naturalistically speaking, even though 
the counterpart action of φ, φ*, has the property that realizes the naturalisti-
cally specifiable rightness role, φ* does not have the property of being right. 
This is because in w*, the rightness-role may be occupied by a different non-
natural property. See also Mabrito 2005: 305–309. I owe the train of thought 
in this footnote to Vilma Venesmaa. 
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desirable but has no desire to φ, then she is internally incoherent, and 
so irrational in the relevant sense. It is by no means clear that an 
account of this sort would properly explain why (PRACTICALITY) is 
true. But by being forthcoming about what the content of a norma-
tive judgment is analytical naturalism seems to hold some promise 
also in this regard.26 
 The classic challenge for analytic naturalism is provided by G. E. 
Moore’s (1903: §12–13) Open Question Argument (OQA) in his 
Principia Ethica. Moore charged many earlier philosophers of having 
committed what he called the ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ where this fallacy 
was supposed to be the mistake of attempting to offer an analysis for 
the concept of goodness in descriptive or non-normative terms.27 
Naturalistic fallacy, thus understood, would be something that an 
analytical naturalist would be guilty of committing. But why did 
Moore think that an attempt at offering an analysis for the concept of 
goodness in purely descriptive terms would be a mistake? This is 
where his OQA is relevant. This argument of Moore’s can be formu-
lated as follows:28 
                                                 
26 For attempts at explaining something like (PRACTICALITY) in something 
like this way, see Lewis 1989 and Jackson & Pettit 1995. Michael Smith’s 
(1994; 1997; 2001; 2002) work is essential here, although his preferred 
analysis of the content of normative judgment is not given in purely non-
normative terms. For criticisms, see Holton 1996; unpublished; Wedgwood 
2007a: ch. 3. 
27 It is a bit silly name for this alleged mistake, as making this mistake need 
not be due to any fallacy. Also, the same mistake can be committed by 
someone who thinks, for example, that rightness is the property of being 
approved of by God, which one might be disinclined to think of as a natu-
ralistic property. (I am, then, a Moorean of sorts in my laxity concerning the 
use of the terms ‘natural,’ ‘naturalistic,’ and their ilk.) 
28 Or this is, anyway, one historically important way of formulating the 
argument. In my formulation of the argument, I follow closely Alex Miller 
(2003: 13–14). The conclusion of the argument is often taken to be more 
straightforwardly that goodness is not a natural property. In my Miller-
inspired rendition of the argument, the conclusion is more modest (see also 
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1. Suppose that the concept of goodness can be analyzed in terms 
of some naturalistic concept, N. Then: 
2. To think that some object, x, is N is to think that x is good. But 
then: 
3. Someone who seriously asked ‘Is an x which is N also good?’ 
would betray a conceptual confusion. But: 
4. For any x that is N, it is always an open question whether it is 
also good. That is to say, it is always a significant question, of any 
x which is N, whether it is good: asking the question ‘Is an x 
which is N also good?’ betrays no conceptual confusion. So: 
5. It cannot be the case that the concept of goodness can be ana-
lyzed in terms of some naturalistic concept, N. So: 
6. The property of being good cannot as a matter of conceptual ne-
cessity be identical to the property of being N. 
 
Let us consider, for example, the analysis of goodness in terms of 
what we desire to desire. The question ‘Is x, which we desire to 
desire, good?’ is significant it seems. It is not like asking ‘Is x, which 
we desire to desire, such that we desire to desire it?’ Following OQA, 
we could then reason that to think that some x is good cannot be to 
think that we desire to desire x, and that we cannot, then, identify 
goodness on the basis of this analysis with being such as we desire to 
desire. Moore thought that this line of thought generalizes to concern 
any attempt at analyzing the concept of goodness in descriptive 
terms. 
                                                                                                    
Feldman 2006). Although Moore is often credited for having come up with 
this kind of argument, something like this line of thought had been ad-
vanced by Henry Sidgwick (1907: 109) before him, and goes back at least to 
Richard Price’s (1758) A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals. For a 
discussion of Price in this context, see Åqvist 1960: 117–133. For a discus-
sion of Moore’s metaethics in a historical context, see Hurka 2003. 
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 OQA has been extremely influential, but not many would accept it 
in this ‘classical form’ these days. A problem with this argument was 
famously pointed out by William Frankena (1939). He argued that 
Moore’s argument was question begging – that the fourth premise of 
the argument simply assumes that the view that is being criticized is 
not correct. For suppose that one could give an analysis for the 
concept of goodness in terms of some naturalistic concept, N. Then 
the fourth premise of the argument would not be true. 
 How could the fourth premise be false though? Surely the ques-
tion ‘Is an x which is also such that we desire to desire it also good?’, 
for example, does seem significant. And the point does seem to 
generalize. The problem is that contrary to what Moore seems to be 
assuming here, a correct analysis of some concept may be unobvious. 
According to a plausible view about the nature of conceptual analysis, 
an analysis of some concept, C, gives “us knowledge of all and only 
the inferential and judgmental dispositions of someone who has the 
mastery of the concept C” (Smith 1994: 38). The idea here is that we 
acquire the mastery of some concept by coming to treat certain 
claims as ‘platitudinous.’ For instance, we acquire the mastery of the 
concept of being red in part by coming to accept (for example) 
something like the following as platitudinous: ‘Most everything we 
see is colored,’ ‘Red is more similar to orange than to blue,’ ‘Unper-
ceived objects are still colored,’ ‘If you want to see what color some-
thing is, have a look at it,’ ‘Things don’t usually look the color they 
really are in the dark,’ and so on. Why, then, can correct, informative 
analyses be unobvious? 
 
Because even though someone who has mastery of some concept C 
must have certain inferential and judgmental dispositions, it may not 
be transparent to her what these inferential and judgmental disposi-
tions are, and so, a fortiori, it need not be transparent to her what the 
best summary or systematization of the platitudes that describe these 
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dispositions is. Whereas mastery of a concept requires knowledge-
how, knowledge of an analysis of a mastered concept requires us to 
have knowledge-that about our knowledge-how. It might therefore 
take time and thought to see whether or not C* constitutes an analy-
sis of C because it takes time and thought to figure out what the rele-
vant inferential and judgmental dispositions are and what the best 
systematization of the platitudes describing these dispositions is. 
(Smith 1994: 38.)29 
 
Given this sort of understanding of the nature of conceptual analysis, 
it turns out that even if some question seems significant, it might not 
really be. Perhaps to think that something is good really is to think 
that we desire to desire it – perhaps this analysis best systematizes the 
platitudes that describe our inferential and judgmental disposition in 
relation to our use of the term ‘good’ – but this is just not obvious to 
us. 
 OQA can be revised in order to deal with these concerns, howev-
er. Instead of appealing to the claim that for any naturalistic concept, 
N, the question ‘Is an x which is N also good?’ remains open, we 
might somewhat more modestly appeal to the claim that for any 
naturalistic concept, N, this question seems to the otherwise compe-
tent speakers of English to remain open. If some naturalistic analysis 
of the concept of goodness were correct, we should on reflection 
come to find it natural to guide our thought in accordance with this 
analysis. But it seems that, for any suggested analysis, this would be 
unlikely to happen. Philosophers have thought hard about this issue 
for a long time, and yet they have come up with no analysis that many 
would have been inclined to accept. A very natural explanation for 
why this is so is that the relevant questions really do remain open. We 
                                                 
29 See also Jackson & Pettit 1995; Smith 1998b. 
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could then conclude that absent some alternative explanation for why 
this should be so, we are entitled to reject analytic naturalism.30 
                                                 
30 See Baldwin 1993: xviii–xix; Miller 2003: 18–24; and Strandberg 2004. 
Alex Miller (2003: 23) suggests that both the analytical naturalist and the critic 
of this view need to explain why these questions seem to remain open to 
otherwise competent speakers, and that one cannot explain this by the 
questions’ actually being open, because that would be “no explanation at 
all.” It is not entirely clear to me why this would be so. Let us consider the 
following question: ‘Is an x which is a vixen also hungry?’ Suppose someone 
claimed that this question is not open in the relevant sense. Surely we could 
respond by noting that otherwise competent speakers of English do find the 
question to be open. Why could this not be explained by the fact that the 
question really is open? Maybe the worry is that to say that the question 
really is open is just to say, roughly, that a competent user of the relevant 
terms would think it is, and that we cannot explain why the competent 
speakers find the question open with reference to this fact itself. But we 
would not be explaining why the competent users of the terms in question 
find the question to be open. Rather, we would be explaining why otherwise 
competent or seemingly competent speakers find the question to be open. 
Might not the explanation be that they are competent also in this instance – 
that the question really is open? Be that as it may, we could – as suggested 
also by Miller (2003: 20–24) himself – also attempt to offer a deeper expla-
nation for why it is that competent speakers find questions of the form ‘Is 
an x which is N also good?’ to be open. A familiar suggestion is that ques-
tions of this form remain open because (PRACTICALITY) (or some relevantly 
similar thesis) is true. (PRACTICALITY) says that if someone thinks that 
performing some action, φ, would be good (I am using ‘good’ and ‘desirable’ 
interchangeably here), then, if she is practically rational, she desires to 
perform φ. Plausibly, though, competent speakers of English can imagine, 
for any naturalistic property, N, someone who thinks that performing φ 
would be N, does not suffer from practical irrationality, and yet has no 
desire to act accordingly. A very natural explanation for this is that for any 
N, it is possible to think that something is N, to be practically rational, and 
yet to fail to desire to act accordingly. If this explanation is correct, then we 
may, given (PRACTICALITY), reject analytic reductionism. On this way of 
supplementing OQA, see Darwall, Gibbard & Railton 1992: 117; Jackson 
1998: 153; and Miller 2003: 20–24. This argument, too, is controversial. 
First, it might be suggested that (PRACTICALITY) is not clearly true – alt-
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 How could the analytic naturalist respond? She could admit that 
this constitutes a presumptive case against her view and take up the 
challenge by actually trying to show how we can offer a reductive 
analysis of the normative concepts in terms of the naturalistic ones. 
Jackson and Pettit have tried to do just this by explaining how we 
might be able to come up with what Smith (1994: 44–56; 1998b: 89–
97) calls a ‘network analysis’ – a holistic reduction of our network of 
normative concepts to a network of naturalistic ones (Jackson 1992; 
1998; 2006; 2009; Jackson & Pettit 1995; see also Railton 1993: 76–
81). The basic idea, very roughly, is to use whatever platitudes there 
are concerning the normative in order to construct a very complex 
analysis of the interrelations between the different normative and 
(other) naturalistic properties, to strip away any mention of which 
normative property is which, and then to identify the normative 
properties as the unique set of properties which are in fact related to 
each other and to the (other) naturalistic properties in just the way 
                                                                                                    
hough it is not very easy to find philosophers who would reject this claim. 
Similar theses concerning moral judgments are commonly rejected, so OQA, 
revised in this way, might not work equally well with, say, judgments con-
cerning moral rightness. But (PRACTICALITY) is not a thesis concerning only 
moral judgments. Second, there might be an alternative explanation for why 
competent speakers are inclined to think that for any N, it is possible to 
think that something is N, to be practically rational, and yet to fail to desire 
to act accordingly. They may not have given due consideration to the right 
candidate analysis, which is a very unobvious one (Smith 1998a; Jackson & 
Pettit 1995; Jackson 1998: ch. 6). There might be other ways of giving a 
deeper explanation of the sort that Miller thinks is necessary. One would be 
to deploy an idea from R. M. Hare’s (1952: §5.4) version of OQA. Hare 
suggested that for any N it is possible to commend something on the 
grounds that it is N, by saying that it is N, and because of that also good. If 
N gave the correct analysis for the concept of goodness, this would not be 
possible. We cannot commend something by saying that it is N thanks to its 
being N. Nothing is N because it is N; having some property does not 
explain itself. We could now suggest that this is what explains why seemingly 
open questions seem open to competent speakers. 
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that the big long analysis says the normative properties are related to 
each other and the (other) naturalistic properties. (That is a mouthful, 
I know. For an excellent exposition of the idea, see Smith 1994: 45–
46; 1998b: 89–97.)31 
 I cannot discuss this view in any detail here, but it seems safe to 
say that despite the ingeniousness and sophistication of Jackson’s and 
Pettit’s attempt, the philosophical audience has been skeptical about 
their chances of success. In order for the network analysis strategy to 
work, our normative and naturalistic concepts would need to be quite 
closely intertwined. Jackson and Pettit suggest that they are so inter-
twined. Jackson (1998: 130–131), for example, lists the following as 
platitudes: 
 
(a)  If an act is an intentional killing, then normally it is wrong. 
(b)  Pain is bad. 
(c)  The best option is the right option. 
 
In listing the relevant platitudes, however, we may only include 
conceptual truths – statements of inferences and judgments such that are 
licensed by our normative concepts themselves. Statements (a) 
through (c) seem clearly inadmissible. Competent users of the con-
cepts of wrongness, badness and betterness might reject these claims. 
Contrary to what Jackson and Pettit suggest, it seems like our implicit 
dispositions with regard to the use of (many of) the normative con-
cepts show only very loose connections to naturalistic descriptions. If 
this is indeed right, then the network analyses will be vulnerable to 
what Smith (1994: 48–56; 1998b) calls the ‘permutation problem’ – 
                                                 
31 This strategy, deployed in the context of metanormative theory by Jackson 
and Pettit, is used by David Lewis (1970) in his treatment of theoretical 
terms. Lewis, on his part, was building on Frank Ramsey’s and Rudolf 
Carnap’s work (see Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009). 
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that is: they won’t allow us to fix on any unique set of natural proper-
ties as the realizers of the pattern given by the analysis.32 
 
 
3.2 Synthetic Naturalism 
A more popular form of naturalist cognitivism is synthetic naturalism, 
the view that although normative properties can be identified with 
certain natural properties, this identification does not depend on an a 
priori analysis of the normative concepts. The standard analogy is 
                                                 
32 See also Blackburn 1998a: 85–87, 104–116; Zangwill 2000; Horgan & 
Timmons 2009; Robinson 2009. I think the permutation problem is some-
times misunderstood. One potential reason for the failure of the uniqueness 
condition is that the network analysis does not allow us to distinguish 
between the different concepts that are being analyzed. Smith (1994: 48–52; 
1998b) argues that in the case of color concepts, for instance, the platitudes 
won’t allow us to distinguish one color from another once the color terms 
have been replaced by a set of variables. This claim can be contested 
(McFarland & Miller 1998; Miller 2003: 237–242; although see also Smith 
1998b), and it may be that the case of normative concepts will turn out to be 
different in this respect (Lenman 2008a). But even if the network of our 
normative concepts is asymmetrical in a way that allows the network analysis 
to distinguish between the different normative concepts, it still seems very 
likely that there will be no unique descriptive realization for the pattern that 
these concepts display. Smith’s use of the example of color concepts en-
courages this misunderstanding, perhaps, but when Smith discusses the 
permutation problem in relation to the concept of a normative reason, he 
does not appeal to the idea that the network analysis could not distinguish 
between the different concepts that are being analyzed. The problem is, 
rather, that “when we remove all normative concepts from the statement of 
the platitudes […], we will not have sufficient information left to get the 
extension of the normative concepts we want to analyse right,” and that the 
analysis may offer us “an abstract description of a set of relations, a set of 
relations that may be instantiated equally by, say, a set of reasonable beliefs 
and desires and a set of unreasonable beliefs and desires,” and so leave us 
“unable to use this abstract description of a set of relations to correctly fix 
the extension of the reasonable” (Smith 1994: 162–163). 
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provided by the identification of the property of being water with the 
property of being H2O. Plausibly, these are one and the same proper-
ty. But one cannot possibly come to know that water is H2O through 
engaging in an a priori analysis of the concept of water. That the 
property of being water just is the property of being H2O was found 
out through empirical, a posteriori enquiry. Similarly, then, one might 
suggest that OQA-style considerations are quite irrelevant to the 
prospects of a naturalist, cognitivist view in metanormative theory. 
The concepts of goodness (say) and of any natural property, N, are 
quite distinct; normative claims cannot be analyzed in terms of natu-
ralistic claims. And yet it may be that normative properties and facts 
are identical with certain natural properties and facts. 
 Defenders of synthetic naturalism include Peter Railton (1986), 
Richard Boyd (1988; 2003a; 2003b), David O. Brink (1989), and 
Nicholas Sturgeon (1985; 2006a).33 
 Synthetic naturalism, too, has its virtues. It is a naturalistic view 
that can explain, for instance, why it is that the normative supervenes 
on the natural (although it does not seem to offer us any easy expla-
nation for why this would be a priori). Normative epistemology will in 
                                                 
33 See also Schroeder 2007: ch. 4. Boyd (1988; 2003a; 2003b), Brink (1989: 
ch. 6) and Sturgeon (1985; 2006a) defend what is often called a ‘non-
reductive’ form of naturalism. On this view, it might turn out that normative 
properties are not reducible to any other naturalistic properties. But this view 
does not seem to be very different from the more clearly reductionist forms 
of naturalism. First, I take it that the defenders of these forms of naturalism 
offer the irreducibility hypothesis as something that an empirical discovery 
might (for all we know) show to be false. Second, the ‘sui generis natural’ 
properties would in any case seem to be, as Tristram McPherson (2012: 209) 
puts it, metaphysically continuous with the other naturalistic properties in the 
sense that even if non-reducible, their nature would “be understood in terms 
(natural kinds, causation, homeostatic feedback, etc.) that are themselves 
deeply naturalistic.” These views seem quite different, then, from the non-
naturalistic forms of cognitivism (to be discussed below). See also Parfit 
2011b: ch. 25. 
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many ways look just like any a posteriori inquiry (although this would 
seem to be problematic to the extent that normative inquiry looks to 
be a priori). At least initially, this view seems to allow one to circum-
vent the Moorean, OQA-style worries.34 And of course it is free from 
any problems specific to the non-naturalist or expressivist views 
(which were widely considered to be insurmountable at the time 
when synthetic naturalism began to enjoy popularity). 
 But this kind of view also faces many problems. Synthetic natural-
ists have tended to explain how our normative terms pick out certain 
naturalistic properties by appealing to something like the causal-
historical approach to natural kind terms, familiar from the work of 
Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975). According to this view, 
very roughly, the property picked out by some normative term of 
ours is the property that causally regulates our use of the term in 
question (Boyd 1988). Let us now consider a famous scenario from 
Hare (1952: 148–149) involving a missionary trying to translate some 
terms used by a tribe of cannibals. In Hare’s example, a missionary 
lands on a cannibal island. His grammar book tells him that, by a 
strange coincidence, the cannibals use the term ‘good,’ as we do (and 
in accordance with the OED), as the most general adjective of com-
mendation. The missionary has done his homework, and the canni-
bals can understand him, alright. The only thing that the cannibals 
find odd is that the missionary applies the term ‘good’ to “people 
who are meek and gentle and do not collect large quantities of scalps; 
whereas they themselves are accustomed to commend people who 
are bold and burly and collect more scalps than the average.” 
                                                 
34 This is controversial, though. For arguments to the conclusion that the 
synthetic naturalist cannot escape the OQA-style worries, see Horgan & 
Timmons 1992b and Jackson 1998: 146–150; for further, sympathetic 
expositions of the thought, see Smith 2000: 28–30; Miller 2003: 162–168; for 
responses, see Boyd 2003a: 539 and van Roojen 2006: 174 ff. 
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 This story spells trouble for the thought that when we say that 
something is good we are attributing to it the property that causally 
regulates our use of the term ‘good.’ If the causal regulation view 
were correct, the cannibals’ use of ‘good’ would presumably pick out 
some features of people in virtue of which they collect large quanti-
ties of scalps (or alternatively it might fail to pick out any feature at 
all), in which case the missionary and the cannibals would end up 
talking past each other when they discuss what is (or is not) good. 
But that is not plausible. If the missionary considers a meek cannibal 
a good person, and the cannibals object that he is not, they are disa-
greeing, and so on the same topic and not speaking past each other.35 
 This is a nice problem for the synthetic naturalist. It is of course 
not clear that this problem cannot be solved, and noteworthy at-
                                                 
35 Hare’s story is used to explain this worry in Smith 1994: 32–35, and Ridge 
forthcoming a: ch. 2. A similar, much discussed ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argu-
ment has been developed by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (1990; 
1992a; 1992b; 2009) in a series of papers. Could the synthetic naturalist 
perhaps appeal to the idea that there is a ‘disagreement in attitude’ between 
the missionary and the cannibals? (This idea is explained in more detail 
below, in section 4, when discussing the challenges facing the expressivist 
views.) They hold clashing attitudes toward ‘meek’ people – which perhaps 
is why we are inclined to think that they disagree. But this won’t work. If a 
cannibal claims someone to be good, and the missionary disagrees, he may 
express his disagreement not just by saying that this someone is not good, 
but also by saying ‘That is not true’ – by saying, of what the cannibal said, 
that it is not true. If, however, what the cannibal said is explained with 
reference to what causally regulates his use of ‘good,’ then the cannibal’s 
statement may very well have been true. The person who is being evaluated 
may indeed have whatever property it is that causally regulates the cannibals’ 
use of ‘good.’ The missionary could very well know this, and yet sensibly 
hold on to his view that what the cannibal said is not true. (See Ridge 
forthcoming: ch. 3.) 
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tempts have been made at solving it.36 But I believe it remains to be 
seen whether a fully satisfying response to the problem can be given. 
 I will just very briefly mention another worry concerning synthetic 
naturalist views. They seem to have great difficulty explaining why 
something like (PRACTICALITY) would be true (see Wedgwood 
2007a: ch. 3). 
 Before moving on to discuss the non-naturalist option, I should 
also note that Derek Parfit (2011b: chs. 25–27) has recently advanced 
new arguments against all forms of naturalism. I cannot here attempt 
to evaluate these arguments, though, and it is too early to tell what 
their impact on metanormative theory will be.37, 38 
                                                 
36 See e.g. Sayre-McCord 1997; Copp 2000; 2007: ch. 7; Brink 2001; and van 
Roojen 2006. 
37 For some discussion, see Dancy 2006; Copp 2012; Schroeder forthcoming 
b; and Parfit forthcoming. My impression is that most naturalists have not 
been feeling very deeply troubled by Parfit’s arguments. 
38 A form of naturalism that I have not discussed is the view according to 
which normative sentences express different naturalistic, non-normative 
propositions across different contexts. An example would be a view, on 
which the proposition expressed by ‘Torture is wrong’ is determined by 
what the speaker of this sentence disapproves of. In one speaker’s mouth 
this sentence might mean that torture fails to maximize happiness, but when 
spoken by another it might mean something quite different. This view could 
be called ‘contextualism,’ ‘indexical relativism,’ or ‘speaker relativism.’ (See 
e.g. Dreier 1990; 2009; Björnsson & Finlay 2010; cf. also Prinz 2007.) A 
notorious problem for such views is that they seem unable to adequately 
account for normative disagreement. Moore (1912: ch. 3) famously pressed 
what is essentially the same problem against subjectivism: if you (sincerely) 
say that torture is wrong, and I (sincerely) say that it is not, we clearly disa-
gree. But on the subjectivist view you are saying that you disapprove of 
torture, and I am saying that I do not – and so it seems that if subjectivism 
were true, we would not be disagreeing. It is sometimes suggested that the 
subjectivist can finesse this problem by appealing to the idea of ‘disagree-
ment in attitude’ (see e.g. Jackson 1998: 161–162; 2008), but the problem is 
not so easily solved. This strategy is problematic for the reasons briefly 
discussed in n. 35, above. An essentially similar problem arises for the 
Essays on Expressivism 
 
 
38 
3.3 Non-naturalism 
Nowadays, many philosophers are inclined to think that a naturalistic, 
cognitivist account of normative judgment is not likely to succeed. 
Many accept some form of non-naturalism. They are cognitivists who 
believe that normative judgments are in the business of tracking sui 
generis, irreducibly normative non-natural properties. These properties 
are very different from naturalistic ones. We cannot know them 
through empirical means, but through intuition or a priori reflection. 
 This view, the classic defenders of which include Moore (1903) 
and W. D. Ross (1930; 1939), has gained popularity. Among its 
contemporary proponents are T. M. Scanlon (1998; forthcoming), 
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003), Jonathan Dancy (2004; 2006), Graham 
Oddie (2005), Ralph Wedgwood (2007a), David Enoch (2011), and 
Derek Parfit (2011a; 2011b; forthcoming).39 This resurgence in 
popularity is quite recent. A couple of decades ago, someone like 
Gibbard (1990: 154) could write of this view (calling it ‘Platonism’): 
 
If this is what anyone seriously believes, then I simply want to de-
bunk it. Nothing in a plausible, naturalistic picture of our place in the 
universe requires these non-natural facts […]. To the naïve ear, the 
claims of Platonism sound fantastic; their appeal comes chiefly from 
a lack of anything to put in their place. 
 
                                                                                                    
contextualist views. For a defense of contextualism on this account, see 
Björnsson & Finlay 2010. For a criticism of this defense, see Ridge forth-
coming a: ch. 3. 
39 In some cases (I am thinking of Scanlon and Parfit, in particular), what 
positive things these authors say seems potentially quite compatible with 
expressivism as I understand it. Still, all these authors reject expressivism in 
this sense, for they reject the idea that we could explain normative beliefs in 
terms of desire-like states (perhaps in combination with non-normative or 
descriptive beliefs). 
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Gibbard of 1990, like many others, accepts a view that is often called 
‘naturalism,’ and according to which all facts are natural facts. (This 
view is of course to be distinguished from the related cognitivist view 
in metaethics, which often goes by the same name). On this view, as 
Smith (2000: 23) puts it, “the world is entirely amenable to study 
through the empirical sciences.” Naturalism, in this sense, is not 
wholly unattractive. But neither is it clearly true. A non-naturalist 
about the normative might quite sensibly say that given that there 
really seems to be some reason to engage in certain acts, for example, 
and that the empirical sciences do not seem to deal with what there is 
reason to do, naturalism, as stated above, must be false. Indeed, I am 
quite sympathetic to this response as far as it goes. 
 Still, non-naturalism seems deeply problematic in that it leaves us 
with too many mysteries – it plausibly fails to explain the sorts of 
things that a metanormative theory must explain. 
 First, the metaphysical worry concerning the ‘queerness’ of the 
non-natural properties can be given more substance. The non-
naturalists famously face a challenge in relation to explaining the 
supervenience of the normative on the natural. Given that two possi-
ble worlds are exactly alike as far as their natural properties are con-
cerned, they must also be exactly alike normatively speaking. But if 
normative properties are sui generis, non-natural properties, then it 
seems mysterious why this should be so. Why could there not be a 
possible world just like the actual one (say), naturalistically speaking, 
which would nevertheless instantiate different non-natural properties? 
Worries along these lines can be sharpened in different ways, and 
non-naturalists have offered their responses. The worries are still live 
ones, however.40 
                                                 
40 For formulations of the different problems concerning the explanation of 
supervenience, see e.g. Blackburn 1971; 1985a; Horgan 1993; Smith 1994: 
21–25; Wedgwood 1999; and McPherson 2012. For non-naturalists’ re-
sponses, see Shafer-Landau 2003; 2005a; Wedgwood 2007a: chs. 6 and 9; 
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 Second, the non-naturalist faces trouble with regard to explaining 
normative knowledge, that is, knowledge about normative matters. If 
normative properties really are sui generis properties, then how can we 
know about them? Not just through empirical means. Not just 
through conceptual analysis. Smith (2000: 26) writes: 
 
The only options left seem to multiply the mysteries. For example, 
we might suppose that there is some non-empirical sort of observa-
tion, a sort of spooky sixth sense which allows us to detect the pres-
ence of spooky non-natural properties. But as soon as the idea is 
stated it is plain that it is, in reality, too absurd even to contemplate. 
 
Philip Stratton-Lake (2002: 22; see also Parfit 2011b: ch. 32) offers 
what seems like a common response to this sort of worry, suggesting 
that non-naturalists 
 
claim that certain moral propositions can be known by intuition, not 
because they think we have such a sixth sense, but because they think 
these propositions are self-evident. Intuition is not for them a way of 
perceiving a property, but is a way of grasping the truth of certain (a 
priori) propositions. It might be thought that a priori knowledge in 
general presupposes a mysterious faculty of direct insight, but then 
one’s objection is not to intuitionism as such, but to the very idea of 
a priori knowledge. Furthermore, I see no reason why we should 
                                                                                                    
and Enoch 2011: ch. 6. Some of these responses are criticized in Ridge 
2007b and McPherson 2012. Jackson (1998: ch. 5) argues that given a certain 
plausible supervenience thesis, and a certain kind of view of property identi-
fication (on which necessarily co-extensive properties are identical), it 
follows that normative properties are not irreducible. For responses to 
Jackson, see e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003: 89–98; Dancy 2006; Suikkanen 2010; 
and Enoch 2011: 136–150. For a defense of Jackson on this account, see 
Streumer 2008; 2013b. See also Brown 2011. 
Introduction 
 
 
41 
think that a priori knowledge requires such a mysterious faculty. All it 
requires is the ability to understand and think. 
 
This kind of response, however, is not satisfying as it stands. In 
explaining the idea of self-evident moral truths, Shafer-Landau (2010: 
229) offers the following list of self-evident claims: 
 
 All bachelors are unmarried. 
 If Alice is taller than Bob, and Bob is taller than Charlie, then Al-
ice is taller than Charlie. 
 Anything that happened a decade ago occurred prior to today’s 
events. 
 Uncles have (or had) siblings. 
 The sum of any two odd numbers is even. 
 
These may very well be self-evident claims, but it also seems like they 
might very well be analytic claims – claims the truth of which we are 
in a position to know just in virtue of understanding the relevant 
concepts. By contrast, the non-naturalist wants to say that a claim 
such as ‘Failing to maximize happiness is wrong’ might be a self-
evident truth. This claim is certainly not analytic (as the non-naturalist 
who is likely to be sympathetic to Moorean considerations should 
agree). And so at least claims like those offered by Shafer-Landau do 
not seem to offer a very comforting analogy for the non-naturalist.41 
 Sharon Street (2006; forthcoming) has recently formulated a nice 
epistemological challenge – the ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ – for the non-
naturalist. (Actually Street’s target is wider than non-naturalism, but 
                                                 
41 It is far from uncontroversial, of course, that the claims that Shafer-
Landau offers as examples of self-evident truths would all be analytic. But 
since it is not wholly implausible to think that they might be, it is questiona-
ble whether they are of any help for the non-naturalist in the present con-
text. 
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the dilemma seems to me to be especially powerful against the non-
naturalist.) It is highly plausible that evolutionary forces have shaped 
the content of our normative judgments in many ways: 
 
It is clear, for instance, how fatal to reproductive success it would be 
to judge that the fact that something would endanger one’s survival is 
a reason to do it, or that the fact that someone is kin is a reason to 
harm that individual. A creature who accepted such evaluative judg-
ments would run itself off of cliffs, seek out its predators, and assail 
its offspring, resulting in the speedy elimination of it and its evalua-
tive tendencies from the world. In contrast, it is clear how beneficial 
(in terms of reproductive success) it would be to judge that the fact 
that something would promote one’s survival is a reason in favor of 
it, or that the fact that something would assist one’s offspring is a 
reason to do it. (Street 2006: 114.) 
 
Why is this? What is the relation between the evolutionary forces and 
the sui generis normative truths posited by the non-naturalist? One 
option is to say that there is no relation. But if this is right, then it 
would seem that given a significant enough influence of the evolu-
tionary forces on our normative judgment, it would be extremely 
unlikely that our judgments would have managed to track the inde-
pendent normative truth. Another option is to say that we make the 
normative judgments that we do because tracking the sui generis 
normative facts promoted the reproductive success of our ancestors. 
But this claim, Street suggests, is unacceptable on scientific grounds. 
Non-natural facts do not seem to play the sort of explanatory role 
that this idea would require of them.42 
                                                 
42 Street’s argument has been much discussed. For a sample of the relevant 
discussion, see e.g. Enoch 2011: ch. 7; Parfit 2011b: ch. 33; Skarsaune 2011; 
Shafer-Landau 2012; Joyce 2013; Bedke forthcoming; Berker forthcoming; 
Vavova forthcoming. For broadly similar challenges for non-naturalism, or 
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 I will again very briefly mention one final challenge. Non-
naturalists, too, have trouble explaining (PRACTICALITY). If my 
judgment that it would be desirable for me to have a cup of licorice 
infusion concerns the sui generis property of desirability, instantiated 
by my potential act of drinking, it seems mysterious why it should be 
true that if I am practically rational (roughly in the sense of being 
internally coherent), I will want to drink the infusion.43, 44 
 
 
3.4 Error-theory 
There is (at least) one more option left for the cognitivist. She could 
admit that normative properties do not seem to be like naturalistic 
ones, and that it is implausible that anything really has any sui generis, 
irreducibly normative property. She could go for nihilism, or, as the 
view is often called, error-theory. On this view, normative judgments 
are to be fundamentally understood as beliefs that purport to repre-
sent the normative features of the world, but actually nothing really 
has these features – for example, nothing really is right or wrong. A 
nice analogy is provided by our witch discourse. A genuine judgment 
that someone is a witch is, at least in part, a belief that this someone 
has certain supernatural properties such as a capacity to cast spells. But 
                                                                                                    
for normative or moral realism more generally, see Ruse 1986; Gibbard 
1990: chs. 4 and 6; 2003: ch. 13; Joyce 2001: ch. 6; 2006; Greene 2008; and 
Kitcher 2011. Street’s argument is actually reminiscent of a classic explanato-
ry challenge for the realist, posed by Gilbert Harman (1977: ch. 1). Harman’s 
challenge has generated a vast literature. See e.g. Sturgeon 1985; Sayre-
McCord 1988b; Leiter 2001; Miller 2003: ch. 8; 2009; Nelson 2006. 
43 For non-naturalists’ attempts at explaining (PRACTICALITY), see Wedg-
wood 2007a: ch. 4; Scanlon 2007; forthcoming. For a criticism of Scanlon’s 
attempt in particular, see Dreier forthcoming. 
44 For a recent line of argument in defense of non-naturalism, see Enoch 
2011: chs. 2–4. For further discussion, see Lenman forthcoming; Manne & 
Sobel forthcoming; Enoch forthcoming. 
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actually no one has such properties. Someone who accepts these 
claims is committed to accepting an error theory concerning witch 
thought and talk. 
 Error theorists have usually been concerned to defend an error 
theory about morality, in particular (Mackie 1977; Joyce 2001; 2006; 
Olson 2010). Why would someone accept an error theory concerning 
moral judgments? The classical argument for an error theory about 
morality has as its premises the claims (i) that moral judgments 
involve a commitment to there being ‘objectively prescriptive,’ ‘exter-
nal’ or ‘categorical’ reasons for action – that is, roughly: reasons for 
action that do not depend on the desires or goals of the agents for 
which they are reasons – and (ii) that there are no such external 
reasons for action (Mackie 1977: ch. 1; Joyce 2001: chs. 2–5).45 
 One problem with the error theory is that it is not very plausible 
intuitively, but of course a view that is supported by powerful argu-
ments cannot be quickly dismissed on such grounds. One could reject 
the classic argument in support of error theory by challenging the 
idea that moral discourse involves a commitment to external reasons 
(for this sort of view, see Harman 1975). A more common defense 
strategy has been to argue that there really are external reasons for 
action (see e.g. Shafer-Landau 2005b; Parfit 2011a: chs. 2–4).46 As 
                                                 
45 Mackie (1977: 36–38) also argues for error theory on the grounds that it 
offers a better explanation for the widespread ethical disagreement than does 
the realist view. This argument, in itself, though, does not really support the 
error theoretic view rather than some other non-realist view. For realist 
responses to arguments from disagreement, (best) directed against the error 
theorist in particular, see e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003: ch. 9; 2006. For a recent 
version of the Mackie-style argument from disagreement against moral 
realism, citing some interesting empirical work on explaining the variance in 
moral convictions, see Doris & Plakias 2008. 
46 The debate on whether there are external reasons for action, or whether 
all reasons are ‘internal,’ that is, somehow dependent on our desire-like 
states (maybe those that we would have after rational deliberation), is huge. 
Bernard Williams (1980) is the classic defender of internalism (in this sense 
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someone who does not find the idea of external reasons very puz-
zling, I do not find the support for error theory very weighty (perhaps 
my expressivism helps here – cf. Blackburn 1998a: 264–266; see also 
the rejection of the alleged subjectivist or relativist implications of 
expressivism, below, in section 4).47 
 Error theory also faces a challenge that can be briefly described as 
follows. Plausibly, claims about reasons for belief are also normative 
and involve a commitment to there being external reasons. A moral 
error theorist should, then, plausibly be an error theorist also con-
cerning claims about reasons for belief. But error theory about rea-
sons for belief seems problematic. Indeed, it seems like it could very 
easily be a self-defeating view. And so error theory is plausibly false 
(also concerning moral judgments). Obviously, there is much to be 
said about this kind of challenge, and the debate is underway (against 
error theory, see Cuneo 2007 and Rowland 2013; for error theory, see 
Olson 2011 and Streumer 2013a).48 
 I have now briefly surveyed the cognitivist alternatives of accept-
ing some form of naturalism (analytic or synthetic), non-naturalism, 
or error theory. All these views have their attractions, but also face 
some familiar, formidable problems. In the papers constitutive of this 
thesis, I do not discuss these familiar problems in any great detail. But 
I hope to add to them by raising yet another problem for all forms of 
cognitivism in Essay 5 (Toppinen 2013b). Before I move on to 
                                                                                                    
of the word). Parfit (2011a: chs. 3–4) makes a powerful case against reasons 
internalism. For recent internalism-friendly pieces, see e.g. Markovits 2011, 
Sobel 2011, and Manne unpublished. 
47 Moreover, even if moral judgments did involve a commitment to there 
being external reasons and it did turn out that such reasons are suspect, the 
argument for error theory would in any case require an extra premise to the 
effect that moral judgments must be understood in a cognitivist way. This 
premise would of course be rejected by an expressivist. 
48 For some more discussion of error theory, see also Finlay 2008; 2011; 
Joyce 2011; Köhler & Ridge 2013; and Lenman 2013. 
Essays on Expressivism 
 
 
46 
discuss the expressivist option that I myself find attractive, I will very 
briefly address the question of whether I have missed an important 
view in my quick survey of the theories in the cognitivist camp. The 
candidate for being missed is a view called ‘constructivism.’ 
 
 
3.5 Constructivism? 
Constructivism is roughly the idea that we somehow construct the 
normative facts – that for something to have some normative proper-
ty is for it to be related to us in a certain way, to be an object of our 
desires under certain conditions, say. A very natural thought is that 
this is just one form of naturalistic cognitivism. Or perhaps the 
thought is that something has some normative property in virtue of its 
being related to us in some appropriate way (and not that having the 
normative property is identical to having the property of being related 
to us in this way). But that seems like a first-order normative claim, 
quite compatible with a non-naturalist or an expressivist reading, for 
example. Is there a metanormative view – distinct from a certain kind 
of naturalist view – that would deserve the name ‘constructivism’? 
 Street (2008) is a recent, prominent defender of constructivism. 
On her view, according to metaethical constructivism, “the fact that 
X is a reason to Y for agent A is constituted by the fact that the 
judgment that X is a reason to Y (for A) withstands scrutiny from the 
standpoint of A’s other judgments about reasons” (Street 2008: 223). 
But again, this seems like a first-order normative claim. It does in-
volve a claim about normative judgments, but it does not tell us how 
to construe them. If the ‘judgment that X is a reason to Y’ is under-
stood as a belief, this normative claim seems to involve a commit-
ment to a cognitivist view of sorts; if it is understood as a desire-like 
state, then this normative claim seems to involve a commitment to an 
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expressivist view of sorts. Either way, Street would not have formu-
lated a distinctive, constructivist metaethical view here.49, 50 
 I am doubtful, then, that there is a distinctive constructivist alter-
native for a metanormative cognitivist. This concludes my survey of 
the cognitivist positions; I next move on to discuss the expressivist 
alternative. 
 
                                                 
49 Street (2008: 239–242) is aware of this problem, of course, and has some-
thing to say in her defense. For discussion, see Lenman 2012 and Ridge 
2012. For a discussion of whether another prominent self-described con-
structivist, Christine Korsgaard (1996), has a distinctively constructivist 
metaethical view, see Gibbard 1999 and Hussain & Shah 2006. 
50 I have not said much about the currently popular ‘hybrid’ cognitivist views 
of various sorts. Hybrid views are views according to which normative 
sentences express (in some relevant sense) both beliefs and desire-like states. 
Sometimes these views are grouped under the title of ‘hybrid expressivism’ 
(see e.g. Schroeder 2009a), but I would rather not use this expression. Some 
of these views are genuinely expressivist. On these views, a sentence such as 
‘Torture is wrong’ (as used on some occasion) expresses some belief of the 
speaker, but this belief may be true without the sentence in question being 
true, and the meaning of the sentence is not explained in terms of its truth-
conditions (see Ridge 2006; 2007a). I say more on these views in the next 
section. Some hybrid views, though, are clearly cognitivist. The meaning of 
the sentence ‘Torture of wrong,’ for instance, is explained by its attributing 
to torture a certain property, and the normative judgment expressed by this 
sentence is a belief which has the same truth-conditions. According to a 
hybrid cognitivist view, these sentences just express some desire-like state(s) 
in addition to this belief. Such hybrid views seem to be either non-naturalist 
or naturalist, and if the latter, either analytic of synthetic, so I have decided 
not to discuss them separately. This is not to say that hybrid views might not 
have some very significant plusses. For instance, accounting for some form 
of motivational internalism may be easier for a cognitivist who accepts a 
hybrid view. But hybrid views also face some challenges of their own. For 
some hybrid forms of cognitivism, see Barker 2000; Copp 2001; 2009; and 
Boisvert 2008. The idea is aired in passing also in Jackson 1998: 160–161. 
For a critical discussion of hybrid views of different kinds, see Schroeder 
2009a. 
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4. Expressivism (and Non-cognitivism) 
Expressivism is, again, the view that the meaning of normative lan-
guage is to be explained with reference to the kinds of states of mind 
that normative sentences (or utterances) express, and that the states 
of mind expressed should be ultimately understood as roughly desire-
like, rather than in terms of the normative properties that they repre-
sent. 
 The expressivist views can be divided into the ‘pure,’ ‘ecumenical,’ 
and ‘higher-order state’ (or ‘relational’) views.51 
 According to pure expressivism, at least some normative sentences 
express only desire-like states.52 So, a pure expressivist might hold 
that the sentence ‘There is reason to study marine biology’ expresses, 
say, a desire that marine biology be studied. 
 Ecumenical expressivism, by contrast, holds that all normative sen-
tences express both desire-like states and beliefs with descriptive 
contents. Moreover, according to the ecumenical view, the descriptive 
belief expressed by an utterance of a normative sentence is deter-
mined by the desire-like states of the speaker and can be true without 
the utterance of the sentence being true. On the ecumenical view, (an 
utterance of) the sentence ‘There is reason to study marine biology’ 
might express a desire that happiness be maximized and a belief that 
studying marine life contributes to maximizing happiness when 
uttered by a classic utilitarian, but some quite different desires and 
beliefs – perhaps a desire to act only as advised by someone with a set 
                                                 
51 I take the term ‘pure expressivism’ from Mark Schroeder (2009a) and the 
term ‘ecumenical expressivism’ from Michael Ridge (2006; 2007a; 2007c; 
2009a; 2009b; forthcoming a). In describing the pure, ecumenical and 
higher-order state views I closely follow Essay 1, in which I outline what I 
call the ‘the higher-order state view.’ Schroeder (2013) makes a similar 
suggestion, calling the view ‘relational expressivism.’ 
52 See e.g. Blackburn 1971; 1984: ch. 6; 1988b, 1998a; Gibbard 1990; 2003; 
and Schroeder 2008a. 
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of character traits, C, and a belief that someone with C would advise 
us to study marine life – when uttered by a virtue theorist (say).53 
 The mere idea that normative sentences express both desires and 
beliefs with descriptive contents (sometimes called ‘hybrid expressiv-
ism’) is compatible with cognitivism, according to which the meaning 
of normative sentences is to be explained, roughly, at least in part by 
their truth-conditions.54 Ecumenical expressivism is incompatible 
with cognitivism, thus understood. 
 The higher-order state view is usefully understood in relation to, and 
very much reminiscent of, the ecumenical view. On the ecumenical 
view, (an utterance of) the sentence ‘There is reason to study marine 
biology’ would express, roughly, something like a desire that actions 
with a certain (possibly wildly disjunctive) property, K, be performed, 
and a belief that studying marine biology would be K. According to 
the higher-order state view, normative sentences express higher-order 
states of being in complex states roughly of the sort that, according to 
ecumenical expressivism, are expressed by (utterances of) these 
sentences. 
 The relevant higher-order states are not, then, higher-order in the 
sense of being, say, beliefs about beliefs or desires about desires. 
Rather, they are higher-order in the sense of being states of being in 
certain kinds of states. One agent, call him ‘Kwazii,’ might have a 
desire that happiness be maximized and believe that studying marine 
biology is required for happiness maximization. Another agent, call 
him ‘Peso,’ might have a desire that only actions that would be rec-
ommended by someone with certain character traits, C, be performed 
and believe that studying marine biology would be recommended by 
someone with C-traits. Kwazii’s and Peso’s respective beliefs and 
                                                 
53 See e.g. Jackson 1999; Lenman 2003a; Ridge 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 
2009a; 2009b; forthcoming a; Eriksson 2009. 
54 For hybrid or ecumenical cognitivism, see, for example, Stephen Barker 
2000; Copp 2001; 2009; and Boisvert 2008. 
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desires are different, but they are both in the higher-order state of 
being in some complex state consisting of desires to do things with a 
certain property, and of a belief that studying marine biology has the 
relevant property, where this higher-order state is multiply realized by 
their particular states. According to the higher-order state view, being 
in (roughly) this (sort of) higher-order state might constitute thinking 
that there is reason to study marine biology. 
 
 
4.1 History of the Expressivist Tradition55 
It is sometimes suggested that expressivism and its precursors, for 
which I shall here use the term ‘non-cognitivism,’ would be relatively 
recent views in the history of philosophy and in the history of think-
ing creatures, more generally. Parfit (2011b: 380), for example, writes 
that while “Naturalist and Non-Naturalist views have been held for 
more than two thousand years, Non-Cognitivist views have been 
widely held only since the 1930s.” (He also suggests that this is not a 
surprise, given that these views are so implausible!) Thomas Reid 
(1788: 457), too, wrote that “this controversy started of late” (credit-
ing “Mr. Hume” for having “very justly” made this observation), but 
he was of course writing somewhat earlier than Parfit. He writes of 
the approbation of good actions, and disapprobation of the bad, that 
 
for a half century, it has been a serious dispute among philosophers, 
what this approbation and disapprobation is, whether there be a real 
judgment included in it, which, like all other judgments, must be true 
or false; or, whether it include no more but some agreeable or uneasy 
feeling, in the person who approves or disapproves. […] Before the 
modern system of ideas and impressions was introduced, nothing 
                                                 
55 I am grateful to Juhana Lemetti and Aino Lahdenranta, and especially to 
Ville Paukkonen, for discussions on topics relevant to this section. 
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would have appeared more absurd than to say, that when I condemn 
a man for what he has done, I pass no judgment at all about the man, 
but only express some uneasy feeling in myself. (Reid 1788: 457.) 
 
This is a strikingly modern-seeming characterization of what seems 
like a debate involving a non-cognitivist party. Of course it is not 
entirely clear what Parfit means by non-cognitivism having been 
“widely held,” but Reid seems to be suggesting a somewhat different 
view of the impact of the non-cognitivist ideas on the history of 
moral philosophy in dating to the early 18th century the beginnings of 
“a serious dispute” concerning what seem like non-cognitivist ideas. 
 In the rest of this section, I briefly track some possibly non-
cognitivist views in the history of ethics, working backwards from the 
1930s. The resulting list of figures is quite impressive. 
 It is true that non-cognitivism became rather popular around the 
1930s. A. J. Ayer’s influential Language, Truth and Logic was published 
in 1936, offering a sketch of a non-cognitivist view. C. L. Stevenson 
(1937; 1944) was also developing his favored brand of non-
cognitivism around this time.56 Ayer was perhaps – as he himself later 
put it (see Ayer 1984: 29) – unconsciously plagiarizing C. K. Ogden 
and I. A. Richards, who in their The Meaning of Meaning (1946: 125; the 
first of the numerous editions is from 1923) had written: 
 
[A] use of the word is often asserted to occur […], where ‘good’ is 
alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept. This concept, it 
is said, is the subject-matter of Ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 
‘good’ is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. When so used the word 
stands for nothing whatever, and has no symbolic function. Thus, 
when we use it in the sentence, ‘This is good,’ we merely refer to this, 
                                                 
56 See also, for example, Wittgenstein 1929; Barnes 1934; Broad’s (1934) 
discussion of A. Duncan-Jones’s views (for which Broad offers no refer-
ences); Carnap 1935: 24; Russell 1935: 237; and Britton 1939. 
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and the addition of ‘is good’ makes no difference whatever to our 
reference. […] [I]t serves only as an emotive sign expressing our atti-
tude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or 
inciting them to actions of one kind or another. 
 
Axel Hägerström outlined what seems like a non-cognitivist view in 
his inaugural lecture (as professor of practical philosophy at Uppsala) 
entitled “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning” (“On the Truth of 
Moral Propositions”) from 1911. And he was influenced by Edward 
Westermarck, among others. Westermarck is usually interpreted as a 
subjectivist (Hägerström is no exception to this rule), according to 
whom moral judgments are judgments concerning our dispositions to 
respond to things in certain ways. But von Wright (1954; 1963a: 72; 
unpublished) also suggests an alternative, non-cognitivist interpreta-
tion. Admittedly, it is difficult not to read the Westermarck of The 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas as a subjectivist. He writes, for 
instance, that if “I say that it is wrong to resist evil, and yet resistance 
to evil has no tendency whatever to call forth in me an emotion of 
moral disapproval, then my judgment is false.” But he also writes that 
“there can be no moral truth in the sense in which this term is gener-
ally understood,” and that “owing to their very nature,” moral princi-
ples can never be true. (Westermarck 1906: 17–18.) And in his later 
book Religion and Morality, Westermack (1939: 15; see also Wester-
marck 1932: ch. 2) emphasizes that his “earlier statement that the 
predicates of all moral judgments are ultimately based on moral 
emotions by no means implies that such a judgment affirms the 
existence of a moral emotion in the mind of a person who utters it,” 
and writes: 
 
Those who first established the use of [the concepts of bad and 
good] and all other moral concepts felt disapproval or approval and 
expressed in the concepts their tendency to feel such an emotion in 
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the given circumstances. This is what may be called the intrinsic 
meaning of the terms. I do not say that those who use them are 
aware of this meaning. […] If we want to find out the intrinsic mean-
ing of a term we have to examine the circumstances in which it is 
used. And in analyzing the predicates of moral judgments, we are 
guided by the fact that if we ourselves emphatically and truly mean 
what we say when we pronounce such a judgment, we recognize that 
we are apt, or at least think we are apt, to feel a moral emotion of ei-
ther approval or disapproval with regard to that on which the judg-
ment is pronounced. (Westermarck 1939: 16.) 
 
Moore (1903; 1922a), too, may already have come quite close to 
accepting non-cognitivism in his Principia Ethica (see Dreier 2006b), 
and later expressed uncertainty about whether or not the seemingly 
assertoric uses of ethical sentences are actually genuine assertions 
capable of being true or false (Moore 1942: 544–545) – A. C. Ewing 
(1962: 251), however, reports Moore having later said they were such 
assertions, and that “he could not imagine whatever in the world had 
induced him to say that he was almost equally inclined to hold the 
other view.”57 
 Mill offers what seems like a fairly clear example of a non-
cognitivist account toward the very end of his System of Logic, writing 
of an 
 
[…] enquiry the results of which do not express themselves in the 
indicative, but in the imperative mood, or in periphrases equivalent 
to it; what is called the knowledge of duties, practical ethics, or mo-
rality. 
 Now, the imperative mood is the characteristic of art, as distin-
guished from science. Whatever speaks in rules or precepts, not in 
                                                 
57 The similarities between Hägerström’s and Moore’s views are emphasized 
in von Wright 1957: 189. 
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assertions respecting matters of fact, is art; and ethics or morality is 
properly a portion of the art corresponding to the sciences of human 
nature and society. (Mill 1843: ch. XII, §1.) 
 
Mill (1843: ch. XII, §6) also writes that the propositions concerning 
what is a desirable end 
 
[…] are not propositions of science. Propositions of science assert a 
matter of fact: an existence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resem-
blance. The propositions now spoken of do not assert that anything 
is, but enjoin or recommend that something should be. They are a 
class by themselves. A proposition of which the predicate is ex-
pressed by the words ought or should be, is generically different from 
one which is expressed by is or will be. It is true that, in the largest 
sense of the words, even these propositions assert something as a 
matter of fact. The fact affirmed in them is, that the conduct recom-
mended excites in the speaker’s mind the feeling of approbation. 
This, however, does not go to the bottom of the matter, for the 
speaker’s approbation is no sufficient reason why other people 
should approve; nor ought it to be a conclusive reason even with 
himself. 
 
Toward the end of this passage, Mill seems to be saying subjectivist-
sounding things, but it is very plausible that, as one Mill scholar puts 
it, this “is Mill’s rather awkward way of saying that, although a man 
who says ‘You ought to do this’ is not stating that he approves of the 
action in question, he is nonetheless implying it, that what he is not 
stating he feels, he can still be said to express” (Ryan 1970: 190).58 
 It is quite interesting that Mill, who quite clearly thought that we 
can very meaningfully engage in normative ethics, gives what seems 
                                                 
58 For discussion of a non-cognitivist interpretation of Mill, see e.g. Donner 
& Fumerton 2009: 192–194 and Macleod forthcoming. 
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like such a nice example of a non-cognitivist view. And it is also 
interesting that Mill presents these claims as if they were not contro-
versial, at all. Mill was in many ways influenced by Bentham, of 
course. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bentham, too, has been interpreted as 
holding a non-cognitivist view (even if his “grasp of” this view was 
“unsure”) (Postema 2006: 28–29). 
 The history of non-cognitivist ideas might lead further back in the 
sentimentalist tradition of the British moralists. According to at least 
one (to my knowledge fairly mainstream) commentator of Adam 
Smith’s work, Smith would have agreed “with those modern philoso-
phers who describe moral judgments as expressions of approval and 
disapproval concerning human conduct” (Campbell 1971: 87). David 
Hume (1739/1740) has often been read as a non-cognitivist (see e.g. 
Reid 1788: 458; Bricke 1996; Shecaira 2011) – although this of course 
is a highly controversial take on his metaethics (see e.g. Cohon 2008; 
Sayre-McCord 2008). And in a much discussed paper, “Hutcheson’s 
Moral Sense Theory,” from 1955, William Frankena makes a case for 
Francis Hutcheson (1725; 1728) having been perhaps the first rela-
tively clear-cut example of a non-cognitivist.59 
 An even earlier instance of a non-cognitivist view may be found in 
George Berkeley’s writings. Berkeley (1734: 85) famously writes, in A 
Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, that 
 
the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and 
only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other 
ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to, or deterring 
from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; 
                                                 
59 In addition to Frankena 1955, see also e.g. Blackstone 1965 and Peach 
1971. For a case against the non-cognitivist interpretation as well as for 
further references to the relevant debate, see Gill 2006: 299–301. Kivy 1976: 
63–74 opposes a non-cognitivist reading of Hutcheson in the context of 
aesthetic judgment. 
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to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and some-
times entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I 
think doth not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language. 
 
An earlier draft of the text from around 1708 contains a passage 
which suggests that these ideas would have been relevant to his 
potentially non-cognitivist account of moral language. In this passage, 
Berkeley (c. 1708: 111) says that “the full and only” purpose of a 
speaker in saying “Such an action is Honourable” would be “that 
those words should excite in the Mind of the Hearer an esteem of 
that particular Action and stir him up to the performance of it” (see 
Belfrage 1986: 645; 1987).60 
 Finally – or this, in any case, is where I will stop with this quick 
review of non-cognitivist interpretations of some of the key figures in 
the history of moral philosophy – it may be possible to find non-
cognitivist views even in writings from before the 18th century. A 
much quoted passage from Hobbes (1651: 21; cf. Hobbes 1650: 4) 
says that “whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire; 
that is which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate, 
and aversion, evil.” This passage and others have inspired (at least 
potentially) non-cognitivist readings of Hobbes (see Darwall 2000).61 
 It is worth emphasizing again that the non-cognitivist readings of 
all the above mentioned philosophers before around the 1930s are 
controversial, and that I have not here made a case for such an 
interpretation rather than some other kind of interpretation of any of 
                                                 
60 For discussion of a non-cognitivist interpretation of Berkeley, see also 
Stroll 1954: ch. 5; Olscamp 1970: ch. 5; Darwall 2005; and Kail 2007; 2011. 
61 Baruch Spinoza (1677: part III, proposition IX) writes, in a very similar 
vein, that “we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a 
thing to be good,” but that on the contrary “we judge a thing to be good 
because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it.” For some discussion of 
whether Spinoza was a subjectivist cognitivist or rather a non-cognitivist of 
sorts, see Eisenberg 1977 and Frankena 1977. 
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these philosophers. But on the basis of this brief review, it does seem 
that non-cognitivism might very well have a much more central place 
in the history of ethics than is commonly believed. I have concentrat-
ed mostly on the sentimentalist figures in the tradition of the British 
moralists. But presumably the question of the possibility of a non-
cognitivist interpretation could reasonably be raised also with regard 
to many of the thinkers in continental Europe (and perhaps outside 
Europe) – at least as far as the 19th, 18th, and 17th centuries are con-
cerned.62 And who knows, the history of non-cognitivism might 
stretch much further back. 
 
 
4.2 Expressivism: Its Strengths 
Expressivism is a very attractive view, I think, because it allows us to 
make sense of the sui generis nature of normative judgments – of their 
seemingly having a quite distinctive topic of their own as well as of 
their being essentially linked to action – within a broadly naturalistic 
understanding of the world. By a broadly naturalistic understanding 
of the world I do not mean a view, according to which all facts are 
natural facts, or all knowledge (of non-analytic truths) is empirical 
knowledge. Rather, I mean roughly a view which offers explanations 
when explanations seem to be needed. Someone who accepts this 
sort of view cannot be content with taking the supervenience of the 
normative on the natural or the truth of (PRACTICALITY), say, to be 
just brute facts. Whereas the naturalist forms of cognitivism seem to 
lose sight of the distinctive nature of normative matters, the non-
naturalist forms of cognitivism seem to leave too much in want of 
                                                 
62 For an account of the German and Austrian roots of the ideas that in-
spired Stevenson’s emotivism, including (at least superficially) non-
cognitivist sounding citations from Wilhelm Windelband (from 1882) and 
early Kant (from 1764), see Sartris 1987: 5–20. 
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explanation. It looks as though the expressivist project could perhaps 
steer clear of both of these problems. 
 Expressivism is compatible with a naturalism that says that all facts 
are natural facts. But obviously an expressivist who accepts this kind 
of naturalism will not be able to account for the possibility of norma-
tive facts. An expressivist could also accept a form of naturalism 
which says that all facts can be explained in naturalistic terms either 
directly as natural facts, or indirectly as facts judgments about which can 
be understood in purely naturalistic terms (see Gibbard 2003: 193–
194). An expressivist who accepts this kind of naturalism can counte-
nance the existence of genuine, irreducibly normative facts. Finally, 
an expressivist could perhaps reject even this form of naturalism, but 
still succeed in explaining what needs to be explained. I argue for this 
last claim in Essay 2. 
 How does expressivism explain the truth of (PRACTICALITY)? 
This is, again, the following claim: 
 
(PRACTICALITY) Necessarily, if one judges that φ-ing would be desir-
able, then, if one is rational, one is thereby also motivated to φ.63 
                                                 
63 I have been assuming that (PRACTICALITY) is true, but this is not com-
pletely uncontroversial. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2009) gives an example of 
Kirsten, who thinks that solitary quietude is intrinsically desirable, suffers 
from no practical irrationality, and yet has no desire to seek or promote 
solitary quietude. Now, it seems right that Kirsten may not seek solitary 
quietude. She knows she would not enjoy it. It also seems true that she 
might not seek it even if she were to enjoy it (Svavarsdóttir 2009: 304–305). 
She might deem other things more desirable and not have the time to pursue 
everything that is worth desiring. It is also possible that Kirsten prefers that 
people do not actually seek or enjoy solitary quietude. Again, she might think 
that this would ruin their possibilities for finding even greater value in other 
endeavours. And so it might be true that when Kirsten admonishes kids for 
ridiculing those who seek solitary quietude or considers the value of solitary 
quietude in counselling her friend, her motivation is not to be explained in 
terms of her seeking to promote solitary quietude (Svavarsdóttir 2009: 305–
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This thesis is to be understood as saying, in other words, that if one 
judges that φ-ing would be desirable, then, if one is rational, one is 
motivated to φ (in part) in virtue of being rational. The expressivist 
explanation for the intimate connection between normative judgment 
and motivation is, very roughly, that according to expressivism, 
normative judgments just are desire-like states, and so it is no wonder 
that we are motivated to act in accordance with our normative judg-
ments.64 Or, alternatively, the idea is that normative judgments are 
complex states that involve both desire-like states and beliefs that 
would explain being motivated to act in accordance with them: to 
think that performing some action, φ, would be desirable might 
involve having a desire to do things with some property, K, and a 
belief that φ is K, for example – which would naturally explain form-
                                                                                                    
306). But this is all compatible with Kirsten’s having a desire that solitary 
quietude be enjoyed. And it is not implausible that Kirsten must, if she really 
both thinks that solitary quietude is intrinsically desirable and is free of 
practical irrationality, have this desire. Surely, if she had to choose between 
two worlds, one of which contains nothing desirable and the other one some 
enjoyment of solitary quietude, she would choose the latter. David Copp 
(unpublished) also presents cases which seem like potential counter exam-
ples to (PRACTICALITY). In these cases, the agent thinks that she would be 
morally required to do something (to apologize to someone) but also has 
some reasons to refrain from doing so (apologizing would be humiliating, 
perhaps, or embarrass a friend). In Copp’s view, the agent might, then, lack 
all the motivation to do what she thinks she is morally required to do, 
without suffering from irrationality in any ordinary sense. But in these cases, 
too, the agent would seem to make better sense, or be more coherent, if she 
was motivated to apologize (where this motivation might manifest as her 
feeling somewhat bad about not apologizing, for example). And so these 
cases do not seem to seriously threaten the plausibility of (PRACTICALITY). 
64 See e.g. Stevenson 1937; Blackburn 1984: 187–189; 1998a: ch. 3; Gibbard 
2003: chs. 7–8. 
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ing a desire to perform φ. (See Ridge 2007a; Essay 1: 257–258, n. 
14.)65 
 How does expressivism explain normative supervenience? The 
explanation goes roughly as follows. According to a plausible expres-
sivist view, we judge things normatively on the basis of their natural-
istic properties. That is: on the expressivist view it is a conceptual 
truth concerning the attitude expressed by a normative claim that 
when I judge that something, x, has some normative feature – that x 
is desirable (or undesirable), say – I have a favorable (or unfavorable) 
attitude toward x in virtue of its naturalistic features. If I then believe 
that y is exactly like x, naturalistically speaking, I am committed to 
accepting that y, too, has the normative feature that I have ascribed to 
x.66 
 If expressivists can make sense of the ‘belief-like features’ of 
normative thought (e.g. of normative claims being truth apt, and of 
their figuring in logically valid inferences), they will have made sense 
of the idea of sui generis normative truth in the process. They will not 
have to offer non-trivial account of what normative judgments are 
about. They also need not worry about OQA-style arguments. Rather, 
they can explain the intuitive force of these arguments. Expressivism 
also fits nicely with the idea that our capacity for normative judgment, 
                                                 
65 It is not instantly clear that the first thought makes for a good explanation 
of (PRACTICALITY). I defend the expressivist on this score in Essay 4 (Top-
pinen forthcoming a). It is also a familiar thought that expressivism forges 
too intimate a connection between normative thought and motivation. I 
briefly discuss this objection below. Also, in Essay 3 (Toppinen 2004) I 
defend Smith’s (1994; 1996; 1997) ‘fetishism argument’ for a thesis not 
unlike (PRACTICALITY) from a number of critics. 
66 See Blackburn 1971: 121–122; 1984: 186–187; Gibbard 2003: ch. 5; Ridge 
2007b. Expressivist explanations for the supervenience of the normative on 
the natural are criticized in Sinnott-Armstrong 1993; Zangwill 1995; Shafer-
Landau 2003: 88–89; and Sturgeon 2009 – although see Shafer-Landau 
2005a: 324 for an admission that Gibbard’s (2003: ch. 5) more recent expla-
nation may be successful. 
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as well as some of the contents of our normative thought, are the 
results of evolutionary pressures of certain kinds (see Blackburn 1987: 
168–169; Gibbard 1990: ch. 4). 
 This should suffice for some of the considerations in the light of 
which one might find expressivism quite attractive. In Essay 5, I shall 
offer another line of thought in support of expressivism, arguing that 
we can only make sense of the possibility of acting for the right sorts 
of reasons on the basis of normative judgments if we accept an 
expressivist view (or a ‘non-cognitivist’ view, as I call it in this essay). 
But I shall not summarize the argument here. 
 Instead, I will next (rather superficially) survey what I take to be 
the central challenges that the expressivists are facing. It turns out 
that they are facing a good number of challenges. Some of these are 
easier to deal with than others. I do not say much in defense of 
expressivism here, but I engage seriously in the essays that follow 
(Essays 1 through 4) with some of what I take to be among the more 
interesting challenges. 
 
 
4.3 Expressivism: Its Problems 
The Allegedly Subjectivist, Relativist, or Nihilist Implications of Expressivism. 
A common worry about expressivism is that it somehow makes 
normativity, or morality in particular, too subjective or relativistic – 
that is, dependent on us in some problematic way. This is an old 
worry, which perhaps shows some signs of being in the process of 
slowly dissipating, but it still holds sway over many philosophers, 
including some prominent metaethicists. For example, David 
Enoch’s (2011: 36) recent argument in favour of a robustly realistic 
construal of normative judgments rests in part on his assuming that 
the expressivist “has to believe that morality somehow depends on 
us, that the ultimate explanation of why it is that certain moral claims 
are true has something to do with us and our feelings and attitudes.” 
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 This is a misunderstanding, however. Expressivism is not at all in 
the business of explaining “why it is that certain moral claims are 
true.” It is only in the business of explaining what it is to accept 
moral claims. This latter explanation is given (roughly) in terms of 
certain desire-like attitudes, but it simply does not follow from this 
that facts about these attitudes would explain the truth of the true 
moral claims. It is perfectly fine for an expressivist to accept, say, 
classical utilitarianism, and to hold that the explanation for why 
certain moral claims are true is given by facts about how much hap-
piness and misery is brought about by certain actions. This explana-
tion makes no reference to the subject who makes the claim, or to 
her community. An expressivist need not accept subjectivism or 
relativism. And so it is possible to accept that expressivism is true and 
that moral claims are not made true by facts about our attitudes.67 
 Another misunderstanding is the idea that if expressivism is true, 
then there are no normative truths, really. It is very common to think 
that expressivism shares its metaphysics with nihilism – that if ex-
pressivism is true, then there are no normative properties, facts, or 
                                                 
67 A relatively straightforward assumption to the effect that expressivism is 
committed to relativism can be found also in Shafer-Landau 2003: 30–33 
and Kerstein 2006. For a “hi-tech” version – as Blackburn (2006) calls it – of 
this kind of worry, see Peacocke 2004: ch. 7. For explanations of why 
expressivism does not commit one to subjectivism or relativism, see Steven-
son 1962; Blackburn 1985: 172–178; 1998a: 279–312, 314; 2006; Horgan and 
Timmons 2006b. See also the discussion in Miller 2003: 73–78. A somewhat 
more sophisticated argument, from philosophy of language, to the conclu-
sion that expressivism collapses into subjectivism has been developed by 
Jackson and Pettit (1998; 2003). For critical discussion, see e.g. Mautner 
2000; Smith & Stoljar 2003; Dreier 2004. Another recent argument with the 
same conclusion can be found in Suikkanen 2009. Schroeder unpublished 
offers a response, as well as a useful overview of the different mind-
(in)dependence worries concerning expressivism. 
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truths, strictly speaking.68 Indeed, it is a common idea, even among 
those who are sympathetic to expressivism, that this ‘anti-realist’ 
metaphysics would be an important motivation for the view (see e.g. 
Horgan & Timmons 2006b: 75). The idea here is that once we have 
discovered that there are no normative facts, really, we must come up 
with some other function for normative language and thought than 
that of representing normative facts, and that expressivism would 
offer a nice alternative account. 
 Actually, it is not fair to call all instances of these ideas ‘misunder-
standings.’ The representatives of the expressivist tradition have 
themselves often denied the existence of normative properties, facts, 
and truths.69 But as I have explained in section 2, above, the contem-
porary expressivist, who is likely to deploy some appropriately mini-
malist notions of a property, a fact, and a truth, might not agree.70 
Once again, expressivism is not the view there are no truths about 
normative matters, or that normative truths are only ‘quasi-truths.’ It 
is, rather, roughly the view that we must explain normative judgment 
without reference to normative properties, facts, and such. Or, more 
precisely, the view that normative properties do not do the kind of 
explanatory work that the cognitivist thinks they do.71 
 It is not clear to me, then, that the expressivist should say that the 
metaphysics of expressivism and nihilism are the same. And I do not 
think that a denial of the existence of normative properties and facts 
should be a motivation for expressivism. It is not as if the expressivist 
finds the idea of normative facts silly, and then tries to explain nor-
mative thought and talk without reference to such facts. The expres-
                                                 
68 See e.g. Brink 1989: 17–18; Darwall 1998: 71–72; Cuneo 2007: chs. 5–6; 
Shafer-Landau 2003: ch. 1; 2010: ch. 20; Parfit 2011b: ch. 28. 
69 See e.g. Carnap 1935: 24, Ayer 1946: ch. 6, and Gibbard 1990. 
70 See e.g. Blackburn 1998a: 77–79; 2010; and Gibbard 2003: 181–183. Cf. 
also Stevenson 1944: 169 ff., 267–268; 1963: 214–220. 
71 See, again, the discussion in section 2 (and in Essay 2) of how to distin-
guish between cognitivist and expressivist views. 
Essays on Expressivism 
 
 
64 
sivist, at least usually, has views about normative matters and so 
accepts that there are normative facts (in the appropriately minimal 
sense). From the expressivist perspective, nihilism only makes sense 
as an expression of an ‘anything goes’ attitude of some kind. The 
expressivist does of course say that there are no normative facts in 
the sense of facts that would play the kind of role in the explanation of the 
meaning of normative thought and talk that the cognitivist thinks they play. But 
this is not an idea that motivates expressivism. This is, roughly, the 
expressivist view itself. 
 Creeping Minimalism. Since the expressivists have increasingly begun 
to express their contentment with the idea that there are normative 
facts, properties, and such, it has become important to gain a better 
understanding of what is at issue between the expressivist and her 
opponent. Answering this question is not a problem only for the 
expressivist, but equally for the defender of the opposing view. I have 
already discussed this problem – the problem of creeping minimalism 
– in the previous two paragraphs and in section 2, above. There I 
explained how Dreier (2004a) has attempted to deal with this prob-
lem, which was to say, roughly, that what is distinctive about expres-
sivism is its offering an account of normative judgment without 
reference to normative properties. Actually, I think that it is quite 
possible that this response to the problem must be revised a little bit. 
This is so if the thesis concerning the ‘normativity of attitudes,’ 
mentioned in the next paragraph, is true.72 
 Normativity of Attitudes. Some philosophers think that the following 
thesis, (NA), is true: 
 
                                                 
72 For more discussion of the problem of creeping minimalism, see Chris-
man 2008a; Dunaway 2010; and Asay 2013. 
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(NA) Propositional attitude ascriptions and judgments concerning 
what state of mind, M, is expressed by some sentence, S, are (or at 
least analytically commit one to) normative judgments.73 
 
If (NA) is true, then the expressivist account of normative judgment 
will appeal to normative properties, and so Dreier’s response to the 
problem of creeping minimalism must be revised. I offer the poten-
tially required revision in Essay 2, suggesting that regardless of 
whether (NA) is true, expressivism can be taken to be the view, 
according to which the properties of normative judgment that a 
metanormative theory must explain are explained by normative 
judgments’ being desire-like states (or complex or relational states 
involving desires and non-normative beliefs). 
 The combination of expressivism and (NA) also gives rise to 
other kinds of worries. If (NA) is true, then expressivism itself must 
be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressiv-
ism self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explana-
tory ambitions central to the view. I won’t discuss these concerns 
here, but I argue, in Essay 2, that the objections to combining expres-
sivism with (NA), as they have recently been developed by several 
philosophers, are not successful. For all that these worries suggest, 
expressivism may be true, and its potential explanatory payoffs need 
not be compromised in any damaging way, even if (NA) is correct.74 
                                                 
73 See e.g. Davidson 1974; 1980; Brandom 1994; Zangwill 1998; 2005; 2010; 
Wedgwood 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Evans & Shah 2012; and Gibbard 2012; 
unpublished. For discussion of (and arguments against) the claims that the 
nature of content or belief would be normative, see e.g. Bykvist & Hatti-
angadi 2007; Steglich-Petersen 2008; 2011; Glüer & Wikforss 2009; forth-
coming. For discussion of (and arguments against) the claim that linguistic 
meaning is normative, see e.g. Hattiangadi 2007. 
74 The worries to which I attempt to respond in Essay 2 are raised in Dreier 
2002; Wright 2002; Shafer-Landau 2003; Zangwill 2010; and Evans & Shah 
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 The Explanatory Power of Normative Properties. One might quite 
sensibly think that it was “the evil of the tsarist regime […] that 
provoked its overthrow” (Gibbard 2003: 1999), or that a child’s 
thriving would be due to her having been brought up well, “with 
decency and humanity” (Sturgeon 1986: 122). This would make good 
sense, perhaps, if normative properties were naturalistic properties 
studied by the empirical sciences. But how are we to make sense of 
this if, for instance, expressivism is true? (See e.g. Sturgeon 1985; 
1986; 2006b.) This is the challenge of making sense of what might be 
called ‘normative explanations,’ of explanations of non-normative 
events that feature normative properties in their explanantia. 
 I will set this challenge, too, to one side here, but I briefly outline 
what seems like an expressivist-friendly approach to normative 
explanations in Essay 2. Very roughly, expressivists may appeal to the 
idea of program explanation, and say that normative properties (e.g. a 
child’s having a good upbringing) can be causally relevant to some 
non-normative events (the child’s thriving, for example) by non-
causally ensuring the presence of some appropriate non-normative 
properties (whatever non-normative properties explain the child’s 
upbringing being good).75 
 The program explanation model is far from uncontroversial, of 
course, but at least it seems like expressivists have promising re-
                                                                                                    
2012. See also Sturgeon 1995: 403–404; Rosen 1998: 399–400; Schroeder 
2008b: 112–113; and Heal unpublished. 
75 For more discussion of this challenge, see e.g. Sturgeon 1985; 1986; 
2006b; Sayre-McCord 1988b; Blackburn 1990; Leiter 2001; Miller 2003: ch. 
8; 2009; Nelson 2006; Sinclair 2012. For the idea of program explanation, 
appealed to by Blackburn (1990: 205–207) and Neil Sinclair (2012) (cf. also 
Gibbard 2003: ch. 10) in order to make expressivist-friendly sense of norma-
tive explanations, see e.g. Jackson & Pettit 1990 and Pettit 1993: 32–42. 
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sources to exploit in order to vindicate the possibility of successful 
normative explanations.76 
 The Frege-Geach Problem.77 A very widespread worry concerning 
expressivism is that the expressivist has no adequate reply to the so-
called ‘Frege-Geach Problem. This problem is commonly taken to be 
perhaps the most significant obstacle for developing an acceptable 
expressivist view. Schroeder (2008a: 19–22, 39–55; 2010a: 41–54, 
105–112) has, in his recent work, offered a neat characterization of 
this problem.78 The challenge for the expressivist is to explain how 
the meanings of complex normative sentences are determined by the 
meanings of the simpler sentences they are made up of. The expres-
sivist must, as Schroeder puts it, offer recipes that tell us what the 
complex sentences express as a function of what their parts express. 
Moreover, these recipes must ‘get things right’: they must allow us to 
                                                 
76 On some views of causation, normative properties might turn out to be 
also causally efficacious, even assuming that expressivism is true (cf. e.g. 
Raatikainen 2010 – drawing e.g. from Woodward 2003 – on mental causa-
tion). I do not know whether this would potentially support expressivism or 
perhaps rather suggest that these kinds of views on causation cannot be used 
to account for mental causation or normative explanation. 
77 In presenting the Frege-Geach problem here, I closely follow my discus-
sion of it in Essay 1. 
78 Many somewhat different problems have been discussed under the 
heading ‘Frege-Geach Problem.’ What follows is a brief exposition of an 
important, live challenge for the expressivist. Peter Geach (1958: 54, n. 1; 
1960; 1965), inspired by Frege, offered early and influential formulations of 
this problem, or at least of a problem that points the way to this problem. 
For a discussion of Geach’s exact way of presenting the problem, and of 
Hare’s (1970) response to Geach (which perhaps adequately addressed the 
problem as Geach put it), see Schroeder 2010a: 44–49. The same problem – 
or something very much like it, anyway – was identified independently by 
Paul Ziff (1960) and John Searle (1962) at around the same time. W. D. Ross 
(1939: 33–34) is often credited for having provided the first clear formula-
tion of the problem (Soames 2003: 310–311; Kalderon 2005: 56; Schroeder 
2010a: 43). I explain why I doubt that Ross did (or at least intended to do) 
this in Essay 1: 258–259, n. 15. 
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explain certain interesting semantic properties of the relevant sen-
tences. (Schroeder 2010a: 48–54.) Consider the following sentences: 
 
1 Drinking is wrong. 
2 Smoking is wrong. 
 
Let us follow Schroeder in taking square bracketed sentences to stand 
for the mental states expressed by those sentences. So, [1] is the state 
expressed by 1, that is, by the sentence ‘Drinking is wrong.’ [1→2] is 
the state expressed by 1→2, that is, by the sentence ‘If drinking is 
wrong, then smoking is wrong’. And so on. Expressivists should, 
then, tell us, for example, what [1→2] and [~2] are, given [1] and [2] 
as inputs, and this account should also help us with explaining, for 
example, why it is inconsistent to be in all three of [1→2], [1], and 
[~2], and why being in [1] and [1→2] commits one to being in [2]. 
(Schroeder 2010a: 105–112.) 
 These are just examples. Expressivists must offer an account of 
not only conditionals and negation, but of any complex construction. 
 The Frege-Geach problem is a difficult challenge for an expressiv-
ist. Let us consider a simple expressivist view, according to which to 
think that drinking is wrong is to disapprove of drinking. At one 
point, Blackburn (1984: 189–196) suggested that we could then 
understand sentence 1→2 as expressing approval of combining 
disapproval of drinking with disapproval of smoking. If one were to 
accept 1 and 1→2 while failing to accept 2, one would then fail to 
have a combination of attitudes that one approved of. But this cannot 
be a sufficient explanation. Refusing to accept 2 is a logical mistake 
that seems quite unlike the ‘mistake’ of failing to have a set of atti-
tudes that one would approve of having. (Schueler 1988; Wright 
1988.) 
 There are other problems with Blackburn’s 1984 strategy for 
dealing with the issue. This account does not seem to generalize to 
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descriptive sentences. That is very worrying. It would be implausible 
if it turned out that there is no unified account to be given of the 
meaning of ‘if…then,’ say, across both normative and descriptive 
contexts. Moreover, normative and descriptive sentences mix. What 
should Blackburn of 1984 say, then, of the meaning of ‘If drinking is 
wrong, then my friends lied to me’? (These questions have been 
pressed e.g. in Hale 1993.) 
 There is more to be said about this, and a lot more has been said, 
but I shall not delve any deeper into these debates here. Suffice it to 
say that the ensuing debate has left the pure expressivist in a difficult 
spot, where even the most sophisticated attempts at dealing with the 
problem seem to involve very serious costs (see Schroeder 2008a, in 
particular).79 
 One might suppose that ecumenical expressivism, according to 
which (utterances of) normative sentences express both desire-like 
states and descriptive beliefs might have an easier time dealing with 
this problem (Ridge 2006). If my utterance of ‘Drinking is wrong’ 
expresses both (something like) disapproval of things with some 
property, K (where K is determined by what I disapprove of), and a 
belief that drinking is K, then perhaps we can easily explain the 
meaning of the complex constructions (where all the normative 
sentences concern wrongness) by holding the state of disapproval 
fixed and varying the descriptive belief. My utterance of ‘Drinking is 
not wrong’ would express disapproval of K-things and a belief that 
                                                 
79 For attempts at solving the problem (or some aspects of it) for the pure 
expressivists, see e.g. von Wright 1963b: ch. 8; Hare 1970; Blackburn 1971; 
1984; 1988a; 2002; Gibbard 1990: ch. 5; 2003: chs. 3–4; 2006; 2012: app. 2; 
Stoljar 1993; Horwich 2005; 2010; Dreier 2006a; 2006c; Horgan & Timmons 
2006; Schroeder 2008a; forthcoming a; Wedgwood 2007: ch. 2; 2010; 
Sinclair 2011; Båve 2013; Charlow forthcoming; Silk unpublished. For some 
criticisms of some of these attempts, see Schueler 1988; Wright 1988; Hale 
1993; 2002; van Roojen 1996a; Dreier 1996; Unwin 1999; 2001; Kölbel 2002; 
Kalderon 2005: ch. 2; and, especially, Schroeder 2008a; 2010a; 2010b. 
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drinking is not K. My utterance of ‘If drinking is wrong, then smoking 
is wrong’ would express the same old state of disapproval and a belief 
that if drinking is K, then so is smoking, and so on. 
 Schroeder (2009a; see also van Roojen 2005) advances a number 
of criticisms against this suggestion. In Essay 1 (Toppinen 2013a), I 
give the ecumenical view a higher-order twist – that is: I present my 
higher-order state view – and suggest that this allows us to answer 
these criticisms. If this works, then there is an adequate solution to 
the expressivists’ dreaded Frege-Geach problem. 
 Motivational Internalism. As noted above, it is often taken to be a 
point in favor of expressivism that it explains the truth of motiva-
tional internalism. There are many different internalist theses (see 
Björklund et al. 2012). It is sometimes suggested that expressivists 
must accept a very strong brand of internalism, according to which 
there is a necessary connection between certain normative judgments 
and motivation. For example, it might be thought that an expressivist 
must accept the following: 
 
(UNCONDITIONAL PRACTICALITY) Necessarily, if one judges that φ-
ing would be desirable, one is also motivated to φ. 
 
This is a very natural thought. According to many forms of expressiv-
ism, if one judges that φ-ing would be desirable, one desires to φ. It is 
also often suggested that to desire to φ is to be motivated to φ.80 If 
this is so, then expressivists of the relevant sort must accept (Uncon-
ditional Practicality). 
 Many find it very plausible, however, that it is possible to deem 
some course of action desirable and nevertheless lack all motivation 
to act accordingly.81 At least many would accept that this is true of 
                                                 
80 See e.g. Smith 1998a; Dancy 1993: chs. 2–3; 2000: ch. 4. 
81 See e.g. Smith 1992; 1994: ch. 3; Thomson 2008: ch. 3; Svavarsdóttir 2009. 
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judgments concerning what would be morally desirable.82 Someone 
who instantiates this kind of possibility with respect to judgments 
concerning what would be morally desirable in particular is common-
ly called ‘the amoralist’ in metaethics literature. If amoralists are so 
much as possible, then (UNCONDITIONAL PRACTICALITY), as it 
applies to judgments of moral desirability, is not true. And so it has 
been argued that given the possibility of amoralism, and the com-
mitment of expressivism to its impossibility, expressivism must be 
false (Brink 1989: 83–85; Svavarsdóttir 2006: 164). Or that at least the 
expressivist must reject the idea that to think that φ-ing would be 
desirable is to desire to φ, and say rather that it is, perhaps, to desire 
to desire to φ (Smith 1998a). 
 This challenge seems to be quite easily avoided by someone who 
adopts the ecumenical view (Ridge 2007a: 67–70), or the higher-order 
state account (see Essay 1: 257–258, n. 14). On these views, thinking 
that φ-ing would be desirable does not necessarily involve a desire to 
φ, so the problem can be avoided. But the pure expressivist, too, can 
deal with this challenge. In Essay 4 (Toppinen forthcoming a), I argue 
that the pure expressivist should not adopt a second-order desire (or 
a similar) view in order to do this. Rather, this problem can be solved 
by drawing an appropriate distinction between desire and motivation. 
The pure expressivist should say that normative judgments are desire-
like states which are normally motivational but may fail to motivate (or 
amount to motivatedness, in case one prefers a more ‘Dancyan’ way 
of putting it) when the conditions are abnormal – as they may be in 
the case of severe depression, or perhaps in some cases of moral 
indifference (cf. Björnsson 2002). This allows for the possibility of 
rejecting (Unconditional Practicality) while accepting a plausible form 
of pure expressivism. 
                                                 
82 See e.g. Brink 1989; Svavarsdóttir 1999; 2006; Bloomfield 2001: ch. 4; 
Nichols 2002; Mele 2003: ch. 5; Zangwill 2003; 2008b; 2009. 
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 Let us grant that an expressivist of any stripe should only accept 
the following familiar claim (I defend Smith’s (1994: 71–76; 1996; 
1997: 111–116) argument for a thesis like this in Essay 3 (Toppinen 
2004)): 
 
(PRACTICALITY) Necessarily, if one judges that φ-ing would be desir-
able, then, if one is rational, one is also motivated to φ. 
 
This does not quite suffice in order to deal with the challenge posed 
by amoralism, though, for the amoralist supposedly need not be 
abnormal or irrational in the relevant sense. She may not suffer from a 
general motivational disorder, or from practical irrationality in the 
sense of internal incoherence. (PRACTICALITY) is very plausible, 
however. And so it should seem clear, by anyone’s lights, that the 
amoralist cannot be making a genuinely normative, reason-implying 
moral judgment. She is supposed to be rational, after all, and yet she 
is not motivated to act in accordance with her moral judgment. She 
must then think that although φ-ing would be ‘morally desirable,’ this 
does not mean that φ-ing would be desirable in the sense that would 
imply that she had any reason to φ. The expressivist can now agree 
that this sort of amoralist is possible, if there are judgments that may 
be sensibly called ‘moral,’ but that are not really normative judgments. 
Plausibly, there are ‘moral’ judgments in this sense. In case the ration-
al amoralist remains indifferent to what seem like moral judgments of 
her own, she may be understood to be making moral judgments in 
the sense of judgments concerning social norms of a certain kind. At 
the beginning of this introduction, I noted that even though it may be 
true that I ought to use the fork with my left hand, this is not a 
genuinely normative claim in the sense that is most relevant to 
metanormative theory, but only a claim about social practices and 
norms of a certain kind. Similarly, it might be said of some action that 
it would be morally desirable in the ‘inverted commas’ or ‘anthropo-
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logical’ (see e.g. Hare 1952: 124–126, 164–165; Smith 1994: 66–71; 
Lenman 1999; 2010a) sense of being generally approved of in society; 
or in the ‘functionalist’ sense of having some features that function, 
say, to promote social stability. The amoralist might be making judg-
ments of what is morally desirable in these senses and fail to be 
motivated to act in accordance with these judgments. But that would 
be fine. No one claims that (PRACTICALITY) is true of these judg-
ments.83 
 Disagreement. What is normative disagreement? Suppose that while 
I think that there is reason to smoke, you judge that there is no 
reason whatsoever to do so. It seems clear that we thereby disagree 
about whether there is reason to smoke. Both of us cannot be right; 
our judgments cannot both be true. But the expressivist cannot rest 
content with this as an account of this disagreement. In virtue of 
what, then, do we disagree? 
 Expressivists do of course have an old, standard response to this 
question. According to this response, our disagreement is what 
Stevenson (1944: ch. 1; 1948) famously called a ‘disagreement in 
attitude.’ He offered the following example, among others: 
 
Suppose that two people have decided to dine together. One suggests 
a restaurant where there is music; another expresses his disinclination 
to hear music and suggests some other restaurant. […] The disa-
greement springs more from divergent preferences than from diver-
gent beliefs, and will end when they both wish to go to the same 
                                                 
83 One could then hold a naturalistic, externalist realist view about some 
‘moral’ judgments (in some non-reason-implying sense) and, for example, an 
expressivist view about genuinely normative, reason-implying judgments. 
This is potentially interesting given that naturalistic externalist realists often 
make claims specifically about moral judgments and not about reasons 
judgments or oughts in general.  
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place. […] it will be a “disagreement” in a wholly familiar sense. (Ste-
venson 1944: 3.) 
 
It is something like this conception of disagreement that is supposed 
to give the expressivist an edge over some competing views that have 
trouble accounting for normative disagreement in any suitable way – 
over subjectivism, for instance (see footnote 38 above). It is widely 
agreed, however, that this idea of a disagreement in attitude does not, 
as it stands, constitute a wholly satisfying response to the challenge at 
issue here. I offer a tentative account of disagreement which is com-
patible with my higher-order state view in Essay 1 (sec. 5), where I 
suggest that two thinkers, X and Y, are in disagreement in virtue of 
their being in states M and M*, respectively, when it is not possible 
for someone to coherently be in both M and M*, and X’s and Y’s 
being in these states, respectively, generates potential for a practical 
conflict between them.84 
 The Moral Attitude Problem. Yet another challenge for the expressiv-
ist is this: Not just any old desire-like state is expressed by a specifi-
cally moral judgment. What is it, then, that is expressed for example by 
                                                 
84 I build on Dreier’s (2009) and Horwich’s (2005; 2010) work on the topic. 
Ayer (1946: 21–22; 1984: 27–28) and Blackburn (1998a: 69) seem to be 
content to appeal to the Stevensonian idea. Gibbard (2003: ch. 4) suggests 
that we should rather understand normative disagreement as disagreement in 
plan. On this account, roughly, we disagree when, for some circumstances, C, 
I plan to φ if in C, and you plan to not φ, if in C. Ridge (2013) argues that 
this account needs to be modified. On his view, all disagreement should be 
understood as disagreement in prescription: we disagree when we would offer 
conflicting advice in circumstances of honesty, full candor, and non-
hypocrisy. Ridge’s criticism of Stevenson and Gibbard seems convincing, 
but I am not persuaded by his positive proposal (although I cannot here try 
to explain why). For a recent case against Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s ac-
counts of disagreement, see Parfit 2011b: 384–389. For more discussion of 
disagreement in relation to expressivism, see also Schroeder 2010a: 88–91, 
99–100; MacFarlane unpublished. 
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sentences of the form ‘φ-ing would be morally wrong’? Ayer’s (1946: 
107; see also 1984: 30) suggestion was that in saying that an action is 
wrong, “I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about it.” But 
this looks unsatisfactory. Alex Miller (2003: 44) puts it as follows: 
 
If we say that moral judgements express irreducible, sui generis, unana-
lyzable ethical feelings we can’t explain moral judgements in terms of 
feeling. What are moral judgments? Those which express ethical feel-
ings. What are ethical feelings? Those expressed by moral judgments. 
This is hopeless. 
 
Miller also suggests that if the expressivist attempts to offer an analy-
sis of the state expressed in non-moral terms, this analysis is likely to 
be suspect for OQA-style reasons. The idea is, roughly, that for any 
suggested analysis, we may admit that someone is in the relevant kind 
of state but meaningfully wonder whether she is making a moral 
judgment. (Miller 2003: 47–51; 88–94; see also Baldwin 2001.) 
 The moral attitude problem is a good problem, but, as Miller 
(2003: 51; 108) himself admits, it is not at all clear that it cannot be 
answered. Perhaps expressivists can offer an a priori analysis of the 
relevant states that just is not very obvious.85 And many expressivists 
would probably wish to provide a synthetic reduction here, and 
identify a moral judgment with some non-morally describable state 
                                                 
85 It is not at all clear that there will be similar obstacles to this strategy here 
as there are in the case of analyzing normative claims themselves. There is 
no similar feeling about the analysandum and the analysans potentially just 
being too different in kind in order for the analysis to succeed. There is no 
similarly impressive history of failures at attempts in giving an analysis. And 
there might not be similarly promising explanations – like the one appealing 
to motivational internalism, perhaps, in the case of normative claims (see 
footnote 30, above) – for why a successful analysis is not going to be forth-
coming. 
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without claiming that this identity is an a priori matter. (Blackburn 
2001: 28–29.) 
 I will only make three further, brief comments on this issue. First, 
this is not a challenge only for the expressivist. The cognitivist, too, 
must be able to distinguish moral judgments from other sorts of 
judgments. And it is not very satisfactory to just say that whereas 
judgments concerning moral wrongness concern moral wrongness, 
judgments concerning aesthetic wrongness concern aesthetic wrong-
ness – unless, of course, we are also being told what moral wrongness 
and aesthetic wrongness amount to. 
 Second, it might help to bring reasons into the picture. Suppose 
that the expressivist manages to offer an account of reasons judg-
ments. If, then, someone takes the fact that some action would result 
in an even distribution of some valued items and also benefit the 
worst-off to be a reason for performing this action, for example, it 
seems pretty clear that she has made a moral judgment. On the other 
hand, if she claims that the structure and melodies of Mendelssohn’s 
violin concerto are reasons for checking out that piece of music, then 
it is probably hard to interpret this as a specifically moral judgment. 
Some reasons seem to be moral reasons, others do not. The bounda-
ries are fuzzy here, but so is the boundary between the specifically 
moral and other normative judgments.86 
 This brings us to my third remark. It looks as though there is 
going to be a lot of leeway in how we can describe the problematic 
                                                 
86 One challenge for expressivists, though, is exactly that of offering an 
account of reasons judgments. Jonathan Dancy (2004: 57–60), in particular, 
has offered a not-much-discussed argument for the conclusion that the 
suggestions from Blackburn and Gibbard, at least, have been inadequate to 
the task. I offer a rough suggestion (very much inspired by Ridge 2006) for 
how to understand reasons judgments, which I believe might help here, in 
Essay 1. Making good on this claim, however, must wait for another day. 
For a more sophisticated, expressivist account of reasons judgments, see 
also Ridge forthcoming a. 
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cases. There is no single sense of ‘moral’ with clear and determinate 
contours at issue here, it seems. Let us suppose that someone takes 
what initially seem like aesthetic judgments to have overriding im-
portance in relation to her other normative judgments. Does she 
prioritize aesthetics over morality? Does she ‘moralize’ what others 
treat as aesthetic matters? We may be justified in talking in both ways 
about examples like these. 
 More could be said here. Others have said at least some of it – for 
recent responses to the problem on behalf of the expressivists, see 
Kauppinen 2010, Köhler 2013, and Björnsson & McPherson forth-
coming. I shall move on. 
 Normative Errors and Uncertainty. How can an expressivist make 
sense of the possibility of a fundamental moral error? And what is it, 
according to expressivism, to be uncertain about a normative judg-
ment? It has been argued that expressivists do not have good re-
sponses to these questions. 
 The standard expressivist account of moral uncertainty is one 
according to which to suspect that one might be mistaken with regard 
to a moral judgment is to suspect that it might be due to (what would 
from one’s own perspective be) a defective judgment-forming pro-
cess: perhaps “to defects of information, sensitivity, maturity, imagi-
nation and coherence” (Blackburn 1998a: 318). The list of relevant 
defects will depend on one’s normative outlook. But it seems that the 
expressivist cannot make sense of the idea of getting normative 
matters fundamentally wrong. One can only doubt a normative judg-
ment in the light of others that one takes for granted. Moreover, it is 
possible to make sense of the idea that others are fundamentally mis-
taken. Andy Egan (2007) has argued that expressivism would make it 
possible for one to know a priori that one is not fundamentally mis-
taken about moral matters, and that the asymmetry between oneself 
and others would involve unacceptable ‘smugness.’ 
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 However, all that follows from the expressivist view seems to be 
that if I am really confident that no improvement whatsoever could 
make me reject some belief, then I cannot think that this belief might 
be mistaken. And that seems clearly true. It does not follow, at all, that 
this belief would not be mistaken. If p is not true, then my belief that p 
is mistaken, no matter how stably convinced I am about its truth. (Cf. 
Blackburn 2009; Gibbard 2011: 46, n. 19.) 
 I do not claim to have thereby resolved the debate concerning 
whether or not expressivists are in a position to make acceptable 
sense of uncertainty concerning normative matters. This controversy 
is still very much alive.87 
 Epistemic Judgments. Sometimes roughly the following argument is 
presented against expressivism. If expressivism is true, then it should 
also apply to claims concerning who knows what, and to claims 
concerning whether certain beliefs are justified. Knowledge ascrip-
tions and judgments concerning reasons for beliefs are, after all, 
plausibly normative judgments, just like judgments concerning, say, 
what we ought to do. But now, if expressivism about knowledge 
                                                 
87 Parfit (2011b: 389–400) is sympathetic to Egan’s worries (see also Scanlon 
forthcoming), but presents also other considerations in support of the idea 
that expressivists cannot account for the possibility of normative mistakes. 
He requires expressivists to explain what it would be for our normative 
judgments to be mistaken (Parfit 2011b: 390). Expressivists, however, are 
not in the business of offering such an explanation, just as they are not in 
the business of explaining what it is for our normative judgments to be true. 
They only offer a view of what it is to make normative judgments. (Cf. 
Blackburn 2009: 207; Gibbard 2011: 46, n. 19.) For a further defense of 
expressivism in relation to Egan’s argument, see Lenman unpublished. For 
an argument to the conclusion that expressivists cannot distinguish between 
uncertainty and certain other features of normative judgment, see Smith 
2002. For responses to Smith, see Lenman 2003a; Ridge 2007a; and Sepielli 
2012. For criticisms of these responses, see Bykvist & Olson 2009; 2012. 
These important debates are not over. If it remains that way for a while (I 
know that many people are working on these topics), I hope to get to them 
in my future work. 
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ascriptions and judgments concerning reasons for belief is true, then 
there are really no facts about who knows what or about whether we 
have good reasons for our beliefs. That is implausible. It would also 
follow that it cannot be true, or a fact, that there is reason to believe 
that expressivism itself is true. This style of argument – with consider-
able added sophistication – has been recently advanced against ex-
pressivism by Terence Cuneo (2007: chs. 5–6). 
 While this kind of argument might work against error-theory (see 
section 3, above), it fails when targeted against expressivism for the 
simple reason that, once again, it does not follow from expressivism 
that there are no normative facts or truths. Still, the following are 
good questions: Can expressivists offer an acceptable account of 
epistemic normative judgments? What would such an account look 
like? According to the expressivist, to know that something, p, is the 
case might be, very roughly, to correctly think that p and to be worth 
relying on with regard to this judgment (see Gibbard 2003: ch. 11). 
Or perhaps it would be, roughly, to correctly think that p, where one’s 
judgment that p would be causally regulated by the right kinds of 
procedures for deciding what to believe, and would not be subject to 
revision in the light of these procedures, given further acquaintance 
with descriptive facts (see Ridge 2007c: esp. 103–105). (An expressiv-
ist would of course understand the normative vocabulary in these 
proposals in an expressivist way.) Expressivists have only begun their 
work on these topics; much remains to be done. But that is all I say 
on this intriguing topic in this thesis.88, 89 
                                                 
88 For important work done on the topic thus far, see also Blackburn 1984b; 
Chrisman 2007; 2012; Cuneo 2007: chs. 5–6. 
89 Three more challenges for the expressivist: The Darwinian Dilemma for 
Expressivists. Above, I have briefly explained how Street’s (2006) so-called 
Darwinian dilemma presents a nice problem for the non-naturalist. (It also 
presents a nice challenge for the naturalist: which natural properties, exactly, 
are the normative properties, given that it contributed to the reproductive 
success of our ancestors to track them?) More recently, Street (2011) has 
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5. The Claims of the Following Essays 
Where does this all leave us? Expressivism is bedeviled by a number 
of familiar challenges, to which the previous section offered a crash 
course. Some of these challenges – the charge of relativist, subjectiv-
ist or nihilist implications, for example – seem rather lightweight. 
Some, such as the question concerning how to understand epistemic 
normative judgment, are extremely interesting, but it remains to be 
seen whether they constitute any serious problem for expressivism. Yet 
other challenges constitute sharper worries and cannot be easily 
dismissed. In the essays constitutive of this thesis, I try to tackle some 
of these. 
                                                                                                    
argued that those expressivists who think that there are mind-independent 
normative truths are in no better shape than the realist in relation to this 
dilemma. Gibbard (2011) and Blackburn (unpublished) have offered re-
sponses to Street, but perhaps more could be said (see also Dreier 2012). 
Wishful Thinking. I might think that if lying is wrong, the souls of liars will be 
punished in the afterlife. Suppose I then come to accept that lying really is 
wrong. According to (pure) expressivism, this amounts to my coming to be 
in a desire-like state of a certain kind. But now it seems like I should be able 
to rationally form a belief – the belief that the souls of the liars will be 
punished in the afterlife – on the basis of being in a desire-like state. That 
seems wrong. Forming beliefs on the basis of desires is not a rational pro-
cess, but rather wishful thinking. This challenge for the expressivist is 
formulated in Dorr 2002. For responses and further discussion, see Enoch 
2003; Lenman 2003b; Ridge 2006: 333; and Schroeder 2010a: ch. 9. Thick 
Concepts. According to some authors, expressivists should account for ‘thick’ 
normative concepts – such as the concepts of braveness, cruelty, or brutality, 
perhaps – in a way that would require disentangling the normative and the 
descriptive components of these concepts in an implausible way (see e.g. 
McDowell 1981). For responses, see Blackburn 1998a: 97–100; 2013 and 
Miller 2003: 244–256. For further discussion, see also Kirchin 2010 and 
Roberts 2011. For a recent, potentially expressivist-friendly theory of thick 
concepts in ethics, see Väyrynen 2013. Yet other arguments against expres-
sivism are presented in Cuneo 2006 and Wedgwood 2007a: ch. 2. For 
responses, see Ridge 2009a and Dreier 2010, respectively. Wedgwood’s 
argument is also discussed in Lenman 2010b. 
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5.1 Essay 1: “Believing in Expressivism” 
In Essay 1, “Believing in Expressivism,” I outline an expressivist 
account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which 
normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain 
kinds of complex states that consist of both desire-like states (or ‘pro-
attitudes’) and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this 
kind of higher-order state view, I argue that it can exploit the resources 
that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing 
with the Frege-Geach problem, and yet avoid the problems associat-
ed with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, 
and disagreement. Of the challenges for expressivism that I have 
focused on above, this essay engages with: 
 
 The Frege-Geach Problem. 
 Normative Disagreement. 
 
 
5.2 Essay 2: “Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes” 
In Essay 2, entitled “Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes,” 
I defend the idea that expressivism is compatible with (NA), which 
again says the following: 
 
(NA) Propositional attitude ascriptions and judgments concerning 
what state of mind, M, is expressed by some sentence, S, are (or at 
least analytically commit one to) normative judgments. 
 
As noted above, many suspect that if (NA) is true, then metanorma-
tive expressivism is in trouble. If (NA) is true, then expressivism itself 
must be given expressivist treatment. Does this make expressivism 
self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or frustrate the explanatory 
ambitions central to the view? I argue that the answer is ‘No,’ or, 
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anyway, that the objections of this kind, as they have been recently 
sharpened by James Dreier (2002), Crispin Wright (2002), Russ 
Shafer-Landau (2003), Nick Zangwill (2005; 2010), and Matt Evans 
and Nishi Shah (2012), have not been successful. Expressivism may 
be true, and its potential explanatory payoffs need not be compro-
mised in any damaging way, even if (NA) is correct. In Essay 2, I also 
suggest that in order to deal with these worries, Dreier’s influential 
response to the problem of creeping minimalism must be slightly 
revised. And so, in this essay, I engage with the following challenges: 
 
 Normativity of Attitudes. 
 Creeping Minimalism. 
 
In the process of responding to one of the arguments advanced by 
Evans and Shah (2012), I also make some comments on the follow-
ing problem (although I offer nothing like a wholly satisfying re-
sponse to it): 
 
 The Explanatory Power of Normative Properties. 
 
 
5.3 Essay 3: “Moral Fetishism Revisited” 
In Essay 3, entitled “Moral Fetishism Revisited,” I defend the ‘moral 
fetishism’ argument against motivational externalism (or ‘moral 
judgment externalism,’ as the view is called in this essay), originally 
presented by Michael Smith (1994: 71–76; 1996; 1997: 111–116). I 
argue that only the internalist views on the relation of moral judg-
ment and motivation can combine two attractive theses: first, that the 
morally admirable are motivated to act on the reasons they take to 
ground actions’ being right, and second, that their virtuousness need 
not be diminished by their acting on their thinking that performing 
some action would be the right thing to do. Toward the end of this 
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essay, I envisage some possibilities for the internalist in light of a 
worry to the effect that the argument, if successful, also undermines 
internalist theories. (Developing these thoughts eventually led me to 
write Essay 5.) 
 
 
5.4 Essay 4: “Pure Expressivism and Motivational Internalism” 
In Essay 4, entitled “Pure Expressivism and Motivational Internal-
ism,” I examine the prospects of pure expressivism with regard to 
capturing the truth of (PRACTICALITY), which, once again, says the 
following: 
 
(PRACTICALITY) Necessarily, if one judges that φ-ing would be desir-
able, then, if one is rational, one is thereby also motivated to φ. 
 
According to pure expressivism, some normative sentences express 
only desire-like states. I distinguish, among pure expressivist views, 
between first-order views (e.g. Blackburn 1998a) and second-order views 
(e.g. Gibbard 2003, at least with respect to judgments concerning 
what would be desirable), which I take to exhaust pure expressivists’ 
options. A first-order view about some type of normative judgment 
says that judgments of the relevant kind concerning, say, some action, 
φ, are at least in part desire-like attitudes toward φ. A second-order 
view of some type of normative judgment says that judgments of the 
relevant kind concerning φ do not involve a desire-like attitude to-
ward φ, but rather consist in desire-like attitudes toward something 
other than φ (which nevertheless is somehow appropriately related to 
φ itself). I argue that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested (see 
e.g. Smith 1998a; Strandberg 2012), first-order views about judgments 
of desirability offer a promising explanation for (PRACTICALITY), and 
that second-order views about such judgments fail in this regard, and 
should for this reason be rejected. I also suggest that these arguments 
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generalize to judgments concerning what there would be reason to 
do. I conclude, then, that considerations from motivational internal-
ism suggest that pure expressivists should be first-order expressivists 
(at least about judgments concerning which actions would be desira-
ble or supported by reasons). 
 In Essays 3 and 4 I endeavor to answer, then, (at least some of) 
the worries concerning: 
 
 Motivational Internalism. 
 
If my arguments in Essays 1 through 4 are cogent, they help to 
assuage some central concerns about the prospects of developing an 
acceptable expressivist view. Above, I have also suggested that the 
following challenge is quite easily answered: 
 
 The Allegedly Subjectivist, Relativist, or Nihilist Implications of Ex-
pressivism. 
 
Among the challenges for expressivism listed above, the following 
remain:90 
 
 The Moral Attitude Problem. 
 Normative Errors and Uncertainty. 
 Epistemic Judgments. 
 
In this introductory essay, I have indicated some ways of approaching 
these challenges, as well as given references to some of the literature 
that engages with them more seriously. Of course much remains to 
be done. Also, I may have omitted some significant challenges that 
                                                 
90 I have briefly mentioned in the footnote 89 the following three challenges 
that I also do not discuss: The Darwinian Dilemma for Expressivists, Wishful 
Thinking, and Thick Concepts. 
Introduction 
 
 
85 
have been raised for the expressivist, and it is safe to surmise that I 
have not taken into account some significant challenges that have yet 
to be identified. Still, if the arguments in the first four essays are 
sound, this is significant progress in answering the problems and 
challenges that expressivism has been thought to give rise to. 
 
 
5.5 Essay 5: “Goading or Guiding?” 
In section 3, I have offered a rough overview of the cognitivist 
options. All the cognitivist views face a number of familiar objec-
tions, which, by and large, still seem to have considerable force. 
 In Essay 5, entitled “Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-
cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning,” I endeavor to develop a 
challenge for all stripes of cognitivists, and to identify a reason for 
preferring expressivism over cognitivism. More precisely, I offer 
support for the expressivist account of the nature of normative 
thought, which I call ‘non-cognitivism’ in this essay. One of my main 
goals here is to introduce the idea that a metaethical theory of the 
nature of normative judgment must be compatible with a plausible 
account of the reasons for which we act when we act on the basis of 
our normative judgments. Another main goal of the paper is to argue 
that when we try to satisfy this desideratum for a metaethical theory, we 
notice that cognitivism faces a challenge that at least some forms of 
expressivism elegantly sidestep. If cognitivism is true, then it is hard 
to explain how someone could perform an action, φ, on the basis of 
her judgment that she ought to φ, and thereby for the reasons that 
one might sensibly take to explain why she ought to φ. This is so 
because on the cognitivist view, when someone performs φ on the 
basis of thinking that she ought to perform φ, she only acts, in virtue 
of acting on this very judgment, for the reason that she ought to – 
which is not something that one might sensibly take to explain why 
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she ought to φ.91 If we accept expressivism, or, more precisely: either 
the ecumenical or the higher-order state view, no similar problem 
arises.92 This, I claim, gives us a reason to prefer an expressivist view 
of a certain kind over cognitivism. 
 All in all, my claims are, then, (a) that expressivists can deal with 
many of the problems that they are often seen as facing, (b) that this 
is so in particular in the case of the higher-order state view, and (c) 
that the competing view, cognitivism, faces a challenge that can be 
escaped if we adopt an appropriate expressivist view (e.g. the higher-
order state view). Somewhat more precisely, I argue (i) that expressiv-
ism is compatible with the ‘normativity of attitudes’ thesis, and (ii) 
that if this thesis is correct, then the debate between expressivism and 
cognitivism needs to be recast, (iii) that Smith’s ‘fetishism argument’ 
for motivational internalism can be defended against its externalist 
critics, (iv) that expressivists need not accept a problematically strong 
version of motivational internalism, and can explain the truth of a 
highly plausible internalist claim, (PRACTICALITY), (v) that the higher-
order state view offers an answer to the Frege-Geach problem, as 
well as (vi) a promising account of (normative) disagreement, and (vii) 
is, in these respects, superior to the ecumenical view (and possibly 
also to pure expressivism), and (viii) that cognitivism offers an unac-
ceptable account of how normative thought guides action – (ix) a 
problem which can be avoided by an expressivist who adopts an 
ecumenical or a higher-order state view. In the light of these consid-
                                                 
91 The fact that one ought to φ is perhaps no reason at all for performing φ. 
See Falk 1953; Broome 2004; and Dancy 2004, 16–17. This sounds plausible 
on reflection, but on many views concerning what reasons are, this would 
not be correct. See e.g. Setiya 2007; Kearns & Star 2008; and Schroeder 
2007: Ch. 2; 2009b. (For an overview of the different accounts of reasons, 
see Wiland 2012.) Be that as it may, it seems indubitable that the fact that 
one ought to φ is not a reason to φ which would explain why one ought to φ. 
And so I base my argument on this more modest claim. 
92 I do not discuss pure expressivism in Essay 5. 
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erations, it seems (x) that the higher-order state view is quite attrac-
tive, and worthy of more exploration.  
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